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ABSTRACT 
The National Guard (NG) will be the first military force on disaster scenes in the 
United States. If the NG is to respond as efficiently as possible, the NG leadership must 
be educated on preparation for and response to disasters.  Research questions used were: 
how to overcome the gap in disaster-response knowledge, and what are the topics on 
which the Department of Defense (DoD) should specifically educate the NG leadership?  
What has caused this education gap and how can the NG leadership overcome it? Survey 
and interview responses revealed that gaps exist in what the NG knows about the state 
response process and knowledge of what the civilians expect from the military.  A review 
of the existing education opportunities available to the NG showed that none covered the 
state process. Using the military decision-making process, courses of action were 
developed to correct this education shortfall. Recommendations included the 
development of a one-week course to address the state response process, DoD 
acknowledgment of the civil support mission, and the assigned and funded ability of the 
NG to educate and train on the civil support missions.   
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I. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Disaster response is an increasingly important mission for the National Guard 
(NG). This importance is evident when reviewing the NG involvement in the aftermath of 
9/11, assisting in the recovery activities following Hurricanes Katrina, Gustav, Ike, and 
fighting of the California fires. The NG has taken a role in providing security and 
assistance in the mitigation of potential disasters, as well as assisting in the recovery from 
disasters, whether from natural causes or from the nation’s enemies.  
This recent experience in disaster response from the state to the national arena has 
exposed a problem that has hindered the effectiveness of NG responses and will continue 
to do so if left uncorrected.  A gap exists between what NG leadership should know and 
what it does know about response to disaster.  This is due to the new emerging role in 
homeland security, civil support, and the continual focus on the war-fighter mission; just 
to name a few causes for the gap.  In spite of the fact that this lack of education, 
specifically for homeland security and civil support mission, has always been an issue for 
the NG, the missions prior to 9/11 were smaller in scope and required simpler, less 
complicated responses than what is now becoming the norm.  With the NG’s increasing 
involvement in responding to disasters on a national level, its operations have become 
more complex in size and scope. The requirements for more and tighter synchronization 
have magnified this shortfall in education to the point where it is now a significant issue. 
Because disaster responses are becoming bigger and more costly, the NG leadership must 
know the response process for both state and federal levels through which the military is 
called to assist the civilian authorities for a smooth response operation.  No longer can the 
military, NG included, have personnel learn “on-the-job” about how to respond or rely on 
having just a few personnel know the response process. All of the NG leadership must be 




better coordinated and effective in working with the civilian responders. In order for the 
NG to succeed in homeland security missions, the leadership should be trained and 
educated 1 in homeland security and civil support.   
B. THE PROBLEM   
Currently, both the state and federal levels of government have processes and 
procedures in place for civil authority disaster response.  If the NG is to provide timely 
and effective support and/or response, it must understand how it will fit in, how its 
response efforts are being planned, and last, how its mission will be carried out in order 
to stay free of financial or legal difficulties while still providing effective response to 
disasters.  Learning the process in the midst of responding to a disaster can result in a 
slow and confused response that could painfully compound the disaster.  The NG 
leadership must understand the variations in the methods of response and assistance 
across the response spectrum based on military duty status, the nature of the event, and 
the differences in state and federal laws pertaining to military involvement.  If this is 
achieved, then the NG would be able to provide a quicker and more effective response to 
disasters in order to support the American citizens.  Mr. Gene Pino, the Training and 
Exercise Director for NORTHCOM, made this point during his welcoming comments at 
the Ardent Sentry (Exercise) Mid Planning Conference 27 January 2009, “To lead, a 
leader must be knowledgeable; leaders must know the  architecture they will fall in on.  
Leaders must understand how the nation [state] will respond to a disaster or they will 
fail” (Pino, 2009). This supports the point the NG must understand and educate on how 
the nation and state respond to disasters.   
Neither the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) nor the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has fully articulated a doctrine for homeland security.  Consequently, the 
DoD has yet to develop missions and requisite training that would support such a 
doctrine.  The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has recommended that DoD 
                                                 
1 Webster’s New World Dictionary defines trained as “verb, 3. to instruct so as to make proficient” 
and educate is defined as “1. to develop the knowledge, skill, or character of, esp. by formal schooling; 
teach;” or in simpler terms used by Admiral Art Cebrowski “you train for the known and educate for the 
unknown.” 
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develop a strategy for utilizing the NG in national emergencies. The GAO specifically 
recommended that “the Secretary of Defense develop and submit a strategy to Congress 
for improving the Army National Guard’s structure and readiness and clearly define the 
Guard’s role in homeland defense and providing Support to Civilian authorities” (GAO 
05-21, 2004, p. 5).  As the role of the NG becomes better defined, then the education and 
mission requirements can be better delineated and developed.   
Currently, the status quo of the NG is that it is organized and directed to meet its 
federal mission requirements, which is almost exclusively directed to wartime missions 
and not to the education of soldiers and airmen in ways to respond to domestic disasters.  
A GAO report explained, “DoD generally organizes, trains, and equips the National 
Guard for only the federal missions it leads…National Guard forces that may have to take 
on homeland security missions are not organized, trained, or equipped specifically for 
these missions” (GAO 05-21, 2004, p. 14). This means that the military may provide at 
best a slow or a poor response to disasters by not possessing or being able to provide the 
appropriately educated personnel.  Because of the lack of knowledge resulting from this 
gap in disaster response education among NG personnel, they may not completely 
understand the problem nor be able to speak or understand the same technical language 
used by various local, state, and federal responders when responding to domestic 
missions. These gaps in knowledge result in higher response costs derived from longer 
times on duty, poor performance due to lack of knowledge, prolonged suffering of the 
citizens, and the potential loss of life.  If the military had a comprehensive list of roles 
and missions, it could develop specific training and education programs to ready units for 
completion of these vital missions and roles.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
Education of the NG leadership on disaster response process, homeland security, 
and civil support missions will help the NG leadership to perform better and fulfill its 
role efficiently. In turn, it can communicate this knowledge to the rest of the NG and 
provide guidance on education and training the soldiers and airmen to perform these 
missions. In the DoD, and specifically the NG, there is a very low percentage of 
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leadership that understands how the civilian authorities respond to a disaster and what 
their expectations are for the NG or DoD when military personnel are requested.  The 
primary research questions are:   
• To overcome the gap in disaster response knowledge, what are the topics 
on which the DoD should specifically educate the NG leadership?   
• What has caused this education gap and how can the NG leadership 
overcome it?   
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Improving the NG’s response capability will not only help the states’ response 
capabilities, but it will ultimately enable the NG to accomplish the overall missions of 
homeland security and civil support, or DSCA. This improvement will speed the 
response, reduce costs and ease human suffering. Improving the states’ response 
capabilities may reduce the federal government’s response requirement and expenses.   
E. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A review of reference material supported the premise that the NG receives 
insufficient education to efficiently meet its mission requirements in homeland security 
and DSCA. Government commission reports such as the Gilmore Commission, 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports, journal articles, and military war college 
theses all contribute to the development of the argument for creating education for the 
NG leadership. 
The Gilmore Commission Report of 2003 recommended that the Department of 
Defense develop a list of homeland security missions specifically designed for the NG.  
The thought prompting this recommendation is that the military could then develop 
training programs to ready the NG units for these missions.  In 2003, DoD followed 
through with this recommendation and requested a mission task list from the DHS, but no 
mission list has been developed as of this writing.   
At least three GAO reports have addressed the need for education and training for 
the NG to perform the homeland security missions.  The first report, Reserve Forces: 
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Action Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Overseas and Domestic 
Missions (GAO-05-21), presented the argument that “Guard personnel may lack the type 
of training and equipment that would facilitate an effective and timely response to future 
homeland security threats” (2004, p. 5). Several findings from the GAO reports 
specifically recommended that the DoD provide training for the NG in its mission of 
homeland security.   
The second report, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve 
Readiness for 21st Century Challenges (GAO-06-1109T), stated that personnel readiness, 
in general, is deficient due to the cross-leveling (moving of military personnel from one 
unit to another unit) of soldiers to fill units deploying for overseas missions.  The report 
mentioned the need for training as well and described the necessity to “identify the 
National Guard’s capabilities to perform these missions [homeland security] and any 
shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training that need to be addressed to perform 
these missions successfully” (GAO-06-1109T, 2006, p. 12).   
The third report, Reserve Forces: Observation on Recent National Guard Use in 
Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges (GAO -04-670T), reiterated 
the second GAO report on readiness issues due to transfer of personnel and equipment to 
support the overseas mission. The report also stated “readiness for homeland security 
missions is unknown because DoD has not fully defined requirements or homeland 
security missions or established readiness standards and measures for them” (GAO -04-
670T, 2004, p. 2).   
These GAO reports indicated that while there is agreement for requiring training 
in homeland security by the military in general and the NG in particular, both the DHS 
and DoD have failed to reach any agreement on the homeland security missions for 
which the military should train.   
Several articles touched on the suggestion for change in the NG mission or role, 
but mostly just as a peripheral issue.  The articles focused mostly on what the authors 
considered the most pressing issue, that of equipment.  In Lieutenant Colonel Kristen 
Cox’s article, “The Evolving Role of Reserve Components in Homeland Security,” her 
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main argument was that the reserve components must change in structure, training, and 
missions to properly perform the homeland security missions;“…the National 
Guard…should modify their organization and training to include a priority mission to 
prepare and deploy in support of homeland security missions” (2007, p. 46).   
In Colin Robinson’s article, “Homeland Security Requirements and the Future 
Shape of the Army National Guard,” his main argument was that the Army, including the 
National Guard, must increase in size and realign its organizational structure to better 
perform its homeland security mission.  His stated belief is that “the Army has not yet re-
optimized its auxiliary forces to deal with the possibility that it might have to suddenly 
send tens of thousands of troops to maintain public order and provide assistance in a large 
city grappling with a catastrophic terrorist attack” (Robinson, 2003, p. 2).   
Timothy Lowenberg, the Adjutant General for Washington State, wrote an article 
that “The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security,” and 
that “The United States enters the 21st century with unresolved questions about what our 
national defense and homeland security strategies should be” (2004, p. 7). He further 
makes the point that officials at the state and federal levels still have policy issues to be 
resolved in the use and application of NG forces.   
Several military war college theses have addressed topics dealing with the 
changing role of the National Guard in DSCA and the organizational requirements as part 
of the transformation of the National Guard. The monograph by Major Kristina Emmons, 
Specialized Regional National Guard Brigades—The Army’s Federal Disaster Response 
Force, raised the concept of creating regional response brigades within the National 
Guard to respond to homeland security missions. Other writers discussed the DSCA 
process and recommended improvements at the federal level for response training as well 
as the need of the National Guard to adapt for the future roles in the area of homeland 
security.   
Current literature revealed that there is no assignment of missions for the NG in 
response to homeland security, civil support, and DSCA. Although authors of this 
literature have identified a need for education and training for the military, specifically 
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for the NG, they made no recommendations as to what the educational requirements are 
or should be.  The fact that the authors made no recommendations may point to their lack 
of understanding of what the potential missions and assignments may be. This failure to 
understand what missions may be required for the NG leads to the corresponding vacuum 
of education and training that if filled would enable the NG to conduct appropriate 
response measures. Logically, then, this lack of preparation for potential missions will 
cause a poor, slow response to disasters.  The military, and specifically the NG, must 
know what missions it will be expected to perform so it can prepare for a better-
coordinated response.   
F. METHOD 
Several potential information sources already exist and can provide details of 
military educational and training requirements. The first source is the NG’s Directors of 
Military Support (DOMS), who are the focal point and the action personnel for the NG 
when it supports the civil authorities at the state and territorial levels. Along with the 
DOMS, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is another potential source of data. A third 
data source is NORTHCOM, DoD’s leading command for homeland security, civil 
support, and DSCA. The last source of information comes from the recent graduates of 
the Naval Postgraduate NG Certificate Program.   
The primary method for collecting data from the above named sources was the 
Delphi survey. Because so little information currently exists in this area of research, the 
Delphi survey, with its iterative process, provided the data and analysis of responses from 
NG participants who directly work in the area of homeland security. The initial sampling 
data was provided by survey of the 54 states and territories NG DOMS. Their input was 
very significant because the DOMS in each state and territory are in positions to possess 
the necessary experience and expertise to be the focal points for the areas of homeland 
security and DSCA. Additionally, the Current Operations (J3) and Training Branch (J7) 
personnel provided information from the National Guard Bureau level with regards to the 
personnel and training available for disaster response training.   
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The second part of the research strategy was to conduct a survey of the recent 
(2007) graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School’s National Guard Certificate Program.  
Because these military personnel have just completed the program, their insight in the 
adequacy of the program proved to be very valuable and timely to this thesis.   
The third part of the research strategy was to conduct interviews.  Interviews were 
conducted with NORTHCOM personnel to gain their perspective on the education 
required for the NG to perform civil support missions. NORTHCOM, as the DoD’s lead 
agency responsible for providing military support of civil authorities, should certainly be 
viewed as a proponent of required education and training of military forces enabling 
quick and effective response. An interview was also conducted with the United States 
Property and Fiscal Officer, the federal government agency responsible for the control of 
expenditure of federal funds and use of federal property within the states.  This federal 
officer, who is responsible for managing the regulatory aspects surrounding the 
expenditure of federal funds within the states and oversees the states’ use of federal 
property, provided insight into the contribution that these regulations on expenditure and 
use have with the gap in education.   
G. THESIS OVERVIEW   
Chapter I introduces the problem, which is a lack of education in the area of civil 
support missions for the military and the NG specifically. It also describes the manner in 
which this thesis will analyze and suggest remedies to eliminate this gap. 
Chapter II discusses the causes of the gap in disaster response.  There is a review 
of the NG history and duty status. It also presents a description of the resources and the 
several courses currently available to NG leadership.  The courses are the USARNORTH 
DSCA course, Joint Forces College Homeland Security Planners course, NGB JOC 101, 
several FEMA courses, and Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate 
Program.  The chapter goes on to discuss the causes of the education gap, from new 
homeland security, the federal response process, DoD not taking on the civil support 
mission, and DHS not providing mission or tasks for the military.   
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Chapter III reviewed the survey and interview data collected.  The questions are 
divided into the topic areas that will follow in the thesis.  The questions are listed with the 
percentages and an explanation of the data followed by quotes that indicated a sampling 
of the responses.   
Chapter IV deals with challenges and process to close the education gap. From the 
process, the NG should know to close the gap to the changes in policy to allow the gap to 
close.   
Chapter V lists the recommendations and describes the proposed steps of 
implementation to close the gap.  This is also the summary of the thesis.   
H. DEFINITIONS 
The following are definitions for purpose of this thesis.  
Gap: The distance between what the National Guard knows presently and what it 
should know for the homeland security and civil support mission.   
National Guard (NG) Leadership: A military member of the Air or Army National 
Guard serving as a platoon leader, officer O-1, a platoon sergeant (E-7, or higher) is 
considered leadership for this thesis.   
Homeland Security (HLS) (as per DoD):  
HS related military operations inside the US and its territories, through 
limited in many respects, fall into two mission area:  HD-for which DOD 
serves as the [lead federal agency] LFA and military forces are used to 
conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and [civil support] 
CS-for which DOD normally serves in a supporting role to other agencies 
by providing military assistance to civil authorities at the federal, state, 
and local levels. (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. II-1)   
Figure 1 (below) illustrates DoD concept of homeland security and how its 
mission fits into this concept.   
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Figure 1.   DoD Operational Description of Homeland Security and Mission Area 
(From DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. XX) 
Homeland Defense (HLD) (per DoD):  
HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, 
and critical infrastructure against external threads and aggression or other 
threats as directed by the President.  DOD is responsible for homeland 
defense, which includes mission such as domestic air defense….D2D is 
the lead or primary agency. (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. vi)  




Figure 2.   Homeland Defense and Civil Support Operational Framework (From DoD 
JP 3-26, 2005, p. xx) 
Civil Support (CS) (as per DoD):  
DOD’s role in the CS mission area consists of support to US civil 
authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement 
within the scope of restrictions required by the Posse Comitatus Act and 
other support approved by the Sec Def.  (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. vi) 
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) (as per DoD):   
Employment of military forces within the US, its territories, and 
possessions, under the auspices of CS, typically falls under the board 
mission of MACA.  MACA mission consist of three mission subsets.  
These mission subsets consist of: military support to civil authorities 
(MSCA); military support to civilian law enforcement agencies; and 
military assistance for civil disturbances. (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. ix)  
Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) (as per DoD), also known as 
Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA):   
MSCA refers to support provided by Federal military forces, DOD 
civilians, contractor personnel, and DOD agencies and components in 
response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents to include 
terrorist threats or attacks, major disaster, and other emergencies.  MSCA 
missions consist of DOD support for US domestic emergencies and for 
designated law enforcement, civil disturbances, and other activities. (DoD 
JP 3-26, 2005, p.ix) 
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Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA) (as per 
DoD):   
The use of the military in law enforcement roles is a sensitive topic and 
restrictions apply to such use.  Military forces performing in this role 
support the lead Federal agency and other supporting agencies and may be 
armed depending on the SecDef decision.  Military support to civilian law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) may include, but is not limited to national 
special security events, support of or combating terrorism, support opt 
counterdrug operations, maritime security, intelligence, surveillance , and 
reconnaissance capabilities, and general support (training support to 
LEAs/loan of equipment/personnel and expert advice). (DoD JP 3-26, 
2005, p.ix) 
Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MSCDIS) (as per DoD):   
The President is authorized by the Constitution and statutory laws to 
employ the Armed Forces of the United States to suppress insurrections, 
rebellions, and riots, and provide federal supplemental assistance to the 
states to maintain law and order.  (JP 3-26, 2005, p. ix)   
I. CONCLUSION   
This chapter introduced the problem, which is that, the NG leadership is lacking 
in education of the disaster response process used by civilians.  The research questions 
were explained as well as the significance of this research, a review of the available 
literature.  The method to collect more data by survey methods was explained.  The 
chapter description, which sets forth the thesis and defines words and phrases utilized by 
DoD, is intended to help the reader understand the terms.   
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II. CAUSES OF THE GAP  
This chapter will explore the gap in disaster response education for the NG in the 
area of homeland security and civil support. The exploration will begin with the 
background on the NG history, missions, and duty status.  This chapter will then review 
the homeland security courses that are available for the NG. Finally, this chapter will 
explore the factors that contribute to this gap in disaster response education and will 
establish the need for the education to eliminate the gap.   
A. BACKGROUND ON NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSE   
1. History  
The National Guard of today traces its roots to the Massachusetts colony in 1636 
when a group of citizens formed a militia to defend their colony in the new world against 
marauding Indians and natural disasters. Later, the U.S. Constitution addressed the issue 
of a militia in several places, the most noteworthy being in Article II, Section 2, which 
stated, “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the 
United States” (U.S. Constitution, 2006, p. 11).  The important point from Section 2 is 
the phrase “when called into the actual Service;” which is viewed as the basis for the 
current Title 10 duty status.  Elsewhere in the Constitution, there is a clause that all 
powers not expressly given to the federal government are considered to be powers of the 
states; this clause provides that the state militias fall under the control of the state 
governors until called to federal service. The militia of the Constitution is the National 
Guard of today.   
2. Mission  
The NG is unique among the military components in that it has two missions and 
serves under two Commanders-in-Chief: the President and the respective state governor.  
The NG is normally considered a state asset until federalized in a Title 10 status. The 
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federal mission of the NG is to support the Presidential and national military objectives 
and to provide ready forces for mobilization. The National Guard must always be 
prepared and ready to go to war.   
The NG supports the DoD’s two missions, the primary mission being homeland 
defense and the secondary mission being civil support.  The following quote from Joint 
Publication 3-26, Homeland Security, from DoD lists the two missions:   
The Armed Forces of the United States support the NSHS [National 
Strategy for Homeland Security] through two distinct but interrelated 
mission areas—homeland defense (HD) and civil support (CS).  HD is the 
protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical 
infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as 
directed by the President.  …DOD’s role in the CS mission area consists 
of support to US civil authorities. (JP-3-26, 2005, p. vi) 
The NG is provided federal funding for what normally works out to one weekend 
a month and 15 days of annual training each year to support the DoD primary mission: 
homeland defense.   
Civil support is the broad all-encompassing term used to describe the support that 
the military provides to the civil authorities for homeland security. Civil support includes 
military assistance to civil authorities, military support for civil authorities, military 
support of civilian law enforcement, and military assistance for civil disturbance (defense 
can be substituted for military). Each of these DoD missions has different requirements, 
applications, and restrictions.  Although it seems logical that these terms, meanings, and 
implications of those missions would be explained in detail to the NG leadership during 
the education process, the current education intended for NG does not cover these areas.   
The state mission is to support the governor by providing trained and equipped 
forces.  The governor looks to the NG as a last resort, before going for federal assistance, 
to protect life and property, to maintain peace, order, and public safety.   
3. NG Response to Disasters  
The NG, with its “Minute Man” response of “come as you are, quickly” 
mentality, has traditionally responded and performed to the best of its abilities to 
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accomplish its missions with what it has on hand. However, the NG cannot continue to 
rely on this type of performance and hope to accomplish newer, more complex missions 
quickly and economically. A quote from the third Gilmore Commission, Third Annual 
Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capability for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, supports this 
point, “We as a nation cannot afford to respond to terrorist attacks on our soil on an ad 
hoc basis after an attack has commenced” (2001, p. 51). At the time of the report, 
terrorism was the biggest concern; while this is still true, the NG is also concerned about 
all hazards and cannot respond without being educated on how to respond to each type of 
hazard or emergency. The nation deserves and requires better than this and demands a 
fast and effective response from the NG in the midst of a disaster. Leadership should 
never opt for the hope that the NG can respond effectively to all disasters; the NG should 
be educated to respond effectively to a variety of disaster types. In the final analysis, 
hope that response will be adequate to meet the challenge should never be the strategy of 
choice.   
4. Response Process  
If the NG is to perform both homeland security and civil support missions, any 
gaps in the education of its personnel pertaining to these missions must be identified and 
filled before the NG can perform effectively. Because the NG is expected to respond to 
state-level disasters, the NG will be the first military responders to any disaster in the 
United States. To understand this impact of the NG domestic deployments on disasters 
within the United States, one needs only to look at the number of NG members on duty.  
On 3 December 2008 there were 4,760 Guardsmen doing domestic operations consisting 
of State Activity Duty and Title 32 missions and 136,166 Guard members activated in a 
Title 10 status around the world (Guard Knowledge Online, 2008).  There are over 4,700 
National Guard members fulfilling domestic missions across the United States; this could 
be an average number deployed for domestic missions for any given day.  The following 
quote from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to Senate Armed Services Committee 
supports the increase in NG involvement in support to civil authorities.   
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The demand for Guard support of civil authorities here at home remains 
high: For example, the ‘man-days’ that Guardsmen have spent fighting 
fires, performing rescue and recovery, and other duties increased by 
almost 60 percent in 2008 as compared to 2007. (Gates, 2009)   
DoD, in its publications, has noted that the NG will respond to disasters it stated, 
“The NG, when in state status, is normally the first military responder to civil support 
incidents that require resources beyond the capabilities of local and other state-level 
emergency response organizations” (JP 3-26, 2005, p. II-13).  The NG will not only be 
deployed before and after any active duty Title 10 force deployments, but it will also be 
deployed to disasters where Title 10 forces do not deploy. As military responders, the NG 
offers more versatility in its deployments to disasters than does the active duty Title 10 
forces, not only because of the Posse Comitatus Act 2 but because NG members are 
spread across the nation and are found in every major city.   
For the NG to best support a state request, the NG must be knowledgeable of the 
state’s process of managing disaster and also how the state officials will request 
assistance.  NG deployment for emergency response must always begin with a request for 
support, which is always initiated at the local or community response level.  This 
approach is supported in the National Strategy for Homeland Security as indicated in the 
following quote from the “Respond to and Recovery from Incidents” section: 
One of the fundamental response principles is that all incidents should be 
handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. The initial response to 
the majority of incidents typically is handled by local responders within a 
single jurisdiction and goes no further. When incidents exceed available 
resources, the local or Tribal government may rely on mutual aid 
agreements with nearby localities or request additional support from the 
State. (DHS, 2007, p. 33) 
When local authorities are incapable of handling the crisis, they then forward a 
request for assistance to the state, which initiates the state-level response:   
                                                 
2 Posse Comitatus Act is a law passed by congress in 1878 to prevent the Army from being pressed 
into service as a posse for the local sheriffs.  DoD has interpreted this that federal Military (includes all 
services) forces can not enforce federal laws.   
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State governments have the primary responsibility for assisting local 
governments to respond to and recover from disasters and emergencies. 
When an incident expands to challenge the resources and capabilities of 
the State coordinate requests for additional support. (DHS, 2007, p. 33)  
It is at the state-level response when the NG is first tasked to respond in one of 
three statuses: State Active Duty, Title 32 Status as a state asset, or in Title 10 as a federal 
asset.  In turn, when the state is incapable of handling the crisis, a federal-level request 
for assistance is made by the state to the federal government.  The federal government 
sends in FEMA and other agencies to respond to the crisis.  These responders, including 
the NG, must be equally trained and exercised at all response levels.   
5. NG Duty Status   
To understand the NG response process, the NG must be totally cognizant of the 
different duty statuses in which the NG personnel can be deployed.  As previously 
mentioned, the NG can be called out under three different types of duty status.  Much of 
what the NG personnel can do when called up for assistance depends upon their duty 
status, disaster declaration, and state and federal laws.  Each duty status has separate and 
distinctive provisions or restrictions related to what duties the NG can legally perform.   
State Active Duty status (SAD) is the least legally restrictive status; the governor 
has command and control over his or her NG.  Under this status, the state has to pay all 
costs associated with the activation.  Depending on the state laws and governor’s 
provisions in the disaster declaration, the governor can waive state policies, procedures, 
and also grant law enforcement officer status to the NG.  When in SAD status, the NG 
members are governed by state laws and have the least restrictions on the missions they 
may perform.   
When the NG is activated in Title 32 status, the federal government activates the 
NG and pays all costs associated with the activation, yet the state governor maintains 
command and control.  In Title 32 status, state laws or the governors disaster delectation 
determine what missions the NG can perform or if it has law enforcement status.   
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The last and most restrictive duty status for the NG is in Title 10 status; the 
federal government activates, assumes command and control of the NG, and pays the 
costs associated with the activation. Additionally, the Posse Comitatus Act, which 
prohibits the use of federal troops to enforce civil laws, applies to any NG member in 
Title 10 duty status.   
B. REVIEW OF CURRENT EDUCATION COURSES FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND CIVIL SUPPORT 
Currently, limited courses exist that are specifically related to civil support for 
either the NG or the military in general.  The Gilmore Commission, Third Annual Report 
to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capability for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, makes a 
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to provide training to the military 
for supporting civil authorities:   
We further recommend that the secretary direct the military departments to 
institute specific training in military units most likely to be involved in 
military support to civil authorities and to expand military involvement in 
related exercises with Federal, State, and local agencies. (Gilmore 
Commission report three, 2001, p.51) 
This commission realized the need for the military to educate and train for the 
response in the area of support to civil authorities.   
A review of the courses offered in homeland security, civil support, or defense 
support for civil authorities revealed the courses discussed below provide some coverage 
of the concepts that the NG leadership should understand if it is to provide an effective 
response to a disaster.  The following courses are reviewed and explored in more depth 
below: the Army North Defense Support of Civil Authorities course, Joint Forces Staff 
College Homeland Security Planners course, NGB Joint Operation Center (JOC 101) 
course, and FEMA courses.   
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1. USARNORTH Defense Support of Civil Authorities Course  
The Army North (USARNORTH) Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) 
course is taught in three phases. Phase One, which is a distance learning phase, consists 
of three parts. Part I of Phase One covers incident management and National Response 
Framework (NRF). Part II covers DSCA, including the operational phases and the DoD’s 
role. Part III covers “preparedness, guidelines, planning scenarios, Universal Task list, 
and Target Capabilities.” (USARNORTH G7 Training, 2008, p 29) The intent of Phase 
One is the development of “awareness, comprehension, and competence of Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities” (USARNORTH G7 Training, 2008, p 29). The distance 
learning phase, which requires about eight hours to complete, also requires the 
completion of each of the following FEMA courses:  ICS-100, An Introduction to 
Incident Command System (ICS); ICS-200, Basic ICS for Single Resources and Initial 
Action Incident; IS-700, National Incident Management System (NIMS) An Introduction; 
and IS-800, NRF An Introduction. Students are required to pass an exam at the 
conclusion of Phase One before proceeding to Phase Two.   
Phase Two is a one week of face-to-face session of classes, small group 
discussions, and exercises with practical application of the instruction on DSCA 
“focusing on inter-governmental and inter-agency response” (USARNORTH, 2008, p. 
29).  
Phase Three provides the student with the changes in DSCA concepts, “strategy, 
and doctrine in Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness” (USARNORTH, 2008, 
p. 29). The course is intended for “senior military officers, DOD civilians and their 
staffs” (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 8-3) and focuses only on the federal response 
phase, not on the state response process.   
2. Joint Forces Staff College Homeland Security Planners Course   
The Joint Forces Staff College Homeland Security Planners course is a 40-hour 
homeland security course with interagency focus. One-half of the student makeup of this 
course is comprised of military mid-grade officers (O-4 and O-5) and the other half is 
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compromised of interagency participants of similar grades. The course is designed to 
cover the national level, DoD, and homeland security interagency processes in homeland 
security policy, strategy, and plans.  The course is only taught a few times a year and 
enrollment is limited.   
3. NGB Joint Operations Center 101 Course   
The NGB Joint Operations Center 101 course is taught by contractors with 
extensive experience in the Florida National Guard, and its response capability.  The 
course focuses on how to run a Joint Operations Center in a disaster setting.  The first two 
days of the week-long course cover basic aspects of DSCA concepts at the state level and 
the manner in which the response process is managed by means of the Joint Operations 
Center.   
4. FEMA Courses   
A search of the FEMA :eb site shows that the agency offers three courses with 
some relevance to the NG’s needs.  The first course, IS-230 Principles of Emergency 
Management, has several topics of interest. Unfortunately, less than 50 percent of the 
topics listed in the syllabus appear to have any relevance to the NG.  Most of the lessons 
address the full spectrum of emergency management from prevention, preparedness, 
response, recovery, and mitigation; unfortunately, only response and some recovery 
aspects apply to the NG. The second course, IS-292 Disaster Basic, is designed to 
provide a basic knowledge of FEMA disaster programs.  Only two of the ten lessons 
appear to have relevance to the NG: Government Response to an Incident and Response 
Operations.  The rest of the course covers the incident command structure. The third 
course, IS-208 State Disaster Management, is designed to cover the disaster assistance 
process. Two lessons appear to have relevance to the NG: Disaster Sequence of Events 
and the Declaration Process. The rest of the course covers assistance related programs.   
The NIMS courses have value to the NG as they assist the NG in understanding 
its role and place in the response process. These courses are available on-line and take 
approximately three hours per course to complete.  As an introductory course in Incident 
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Command System, ICS 100 An Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS), covers 
the history, features, principles, and structure of ICS.  It also explains the difference 
between Incident Command System and the NIMS. ICS-200 Basic ICS for Single 
Resources and Initial Action Incident covers leadership, management, functional areas 
and delegation of authority, and management by objectives. IS-700 NIMS An 
Introduction introduces NIMS, covers purpose, principles, components, and benefits.  
ICS-800, NRF An Introduction, covers the concepts and principles of NRF.   
5. Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program 
The original intention of the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard 
Certificate Program, now discontinued, was to teach this program in each state and have 
it hosted by a college or university through a certificate program designed to educate not 
only NG personnel, but first responders as well. Upon successful completion, this 
program provided a certificate and 12 credit hours that could be applied towards a 
master’s degree program, which the student could complete as time permitted. This 
program consisted of four graduate-level courses of three credit hours each: the 
Foundations of Homeland Defense and Security; Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to 
Homeland Defense and Security; Collaboration to Integrate, Strategic Planning, and 
Organizational Imperatives in Homeland Defense and Security; and Special Topics in 
Homeland Defense and Security. The states of Missouri and Arizona were designated as 
test states. Unfortunately, NGB concluded this pilot program and left it to the individual 
state schools and state NG headquarters to implement further. Appendix II has a more 
detailed review of each of the four courses.   
Regrettably, the courses available for the NG seem to focus primarily on the 
federal-level process with little attention given to the state process.  The gap in education 
is very apparent as seen by the limited number of courses, their content, and availability 
to the NG leadership. The state process of response is the process that the NG leadership 
will use first and must also understand. DoD recognizes that the NG will be the first 
military units at the disaster. For the NG leadership to receive the necessary education, its  
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leaders have to attend many courses and filter the information to find what is relevant to 
the state process, which is not an efficient way to learn and only adds to increased 
training time and costs.   
C. SUMMARY OF FACTORS CAUSING THE GAP  
This section will explore the causes of the gap and the reasons why the gap exists. 
The gap is affected by DoD policies that support the homeland defense federal war-
fighting mission almost to the exclusion of the education for the civil support mission. 
The following is a discussion of these shortcomings and causes.   
1. New Process/Concept/Organization Called Homeland Security 
In 2002, the federal government underwent a major reorganization with the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security.  This creation also brought together 
many agencies in the federal government that dealt with disaster mitigation, response, 
recovery, and prevention. With this new organization came several new concepts or 
strategies to better organize the federal government process in dealing with threats to the 
nation from terrorism to disasters. One of the problems with the creation of the new 
organization was the determination of its role; this has affected its interaction with other 
organizations.  Nevertheless, this new organization has moved forward the process for 
dealing with terrorism and disasters to a new level.  The creation of a DoD combatant 
command, Northern Command (NORTHCOM), to deal with the nation’s homeland 
defense and civil support missions also contributes to the change in the process.  DoD 
and the NG are still trying understand the roles played by the newly created entities, 
adjust to the changes, and develop the doctrine and education needed to prepare for the 
new process, all while fighting two wars and the coordinating with the Department of 
Homeland Security.   
2. Changes in Federal Response Plan also Affects the State Process   
Up until the writing of the Federal Response Plan after Hurricane Andrew in 
1992, there was no federal plan on how to respond to a disaster. Disasters were left to the 
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local entities and states to solve with minimal assistance from the federal government.  
The aftermath to Hurricane Andrew was the first time the federal government developed 
a plan on how it would respond to disasters, giving the states a process and expectations.  
The passing of the Stafford Act in 1988 and Economy Act in 1933 helped to refine the 
federal government response process. Many years later, the next major re-write of the 
federal plan came about with the resulting National Response Plan in 2004; in 2006 there 
were revisions, and it was later modified to the current National Response Framework in 
2008. These progressive developments in the federal response process have caused the 
response process to grow and become more complicated, meanwhile disasters are 
becoming larger.  These changes have also influenced or changed the state’s process.  
Neither DoD nor the NG has kept up with these changes and developments in the 
response process.  Neither DoD nor the NG has provided education on the response 
process to their respective leadership. Therefore, the leadership is responding to a process 
without a complete knowledge or understanding of the process.   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive Five (HSPD-5) has mandated that all 
responses to a disaster will now be managed under provision of the NIMS and the NRF.  
The NG response will be less than optimal if the NG leadership does not understand this 
or has not incorporated this knowledge about responses into its leadership training.  Since 
local and state responses/reaction/mitigation will be well underway and the NIMS and 
NRF systems will be fully functioning by the time the NG responds, the NG should 
understand not only the process and the terms, but also how it can successfully integrate 
into the process and operate within the NIMS and NRF environments. A time of crisis is 
not the time to learn the process, as this will only slow or delay any response, thereby 
allowing needless suffering and increasing the cost of the disaster; neither of which is 
acceptable. To avoid such an occurrence, either DoD or the NG should provide education 
on this process to their leadership.   
3. DoD is Reluctant to Accept the Civil Support Mission  
DoD has participated in civil support mission only when directed to by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Because of its focus on war-fighting, 
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DoD has demonstrated a reluctance to accept the civil support as a primary role. In its 
fourth report, the Gilmore Commission made the following quote to addresses this point.  
While the military participates in numerous missions to support civil 
authorities each year, the Department of Defense does not count this 
support as its primary mission.  Warfighting is the Department’s primary 
mission and takes priority unless the Secretary of Defense directs 
otherwise. (Gilmore Commission Report #4, 2002, p 89)  
Due to this reluctance, DoD has not put much effort to educating the military and 
specifically the NG on this mission.  
Karen Guttieri, author of the article entitled Strategic Insight, Homeland Security 
and US Civil-Military Relations, indicates DoD’s reluctance to assume the domestic 
missions:  
Given that the military seems to have the most to gain by empire-building 
in homeland security, a model of bureaucratic politics might predict the 
military would advocate for a large domestic role.  Instead, the military 
establishment, including the civilian secretary of defense, is strongly 
resisting domestic orientation. (2003, p. 1)  
Accordingly, the services focus on the federal mission and have either resisted the 
pressure to direct at least some training to the civil support or domestic missions.   
DoD continues to place civil support missions as a second priority, even to the 
point of not allowing the necessary supplies to be obtained for civil support missions. 
DoD does not want to commit any resources, e.g., funds, to the civil support missions. 
The following excerpt from a GAO report confirms this:   
Consistent with this strategy, DOD’s current policy [DOD Directive 
3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Jan. 15, 1993)] prohibits, 
unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense, procuring or 
maintaining any supplies, material, or equipment exclusively for providing 
military support to civil authorities. (GAO-08-311, 2008, p 19)  
Because DoD does not place a priority on domestic missions, Congress may have 
to legislate that DoD develop tasks and educate its personnel on these tasks and this 
mission. Neither the former SecDef Rumsfeld nor the present SecDef Robert Gates has 
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given any indication of any change in this philosophy. However, Guttieri indicated this 
point, “Although Secretary Rumsfeld has shown no reluctance to push for transformation 
in structure and operations, however, when it comes to homeland security, he has sided 
with the uniformed services to preserve their insulation from domestic operations.” 
(2003, p. 5) Guttieri’s statement reinforces the point that DoD is reluctant to become 
involved in homeland security or civil support missions.   
4. National Guard Trains for the Homeland Defense Mission   
Unfortunately, because NG current training and education are entirely directed for 
homeland defense, no education is provided for the civil support mission. The Defense 
Appropriations Act provides funds to meet the federal mission of DoD to educate, 
organize, and administer the NG for the “go to war” or homeland defense missions.  
According to the DoD, “The US military organizes, trains, and equips forces primarily to 
conduct combat operations” (DoD, JP 3-26, 2005, p. IV-2). DoD’s own joint publications 
focus only on the combat operations of homeland defense.  A GAO report addressed the 
funding for the NG, “Currently, the vast majority of the National Guard’s personnel, 
training, and equipment is provided for its federal war-fighting mission with funding 
appropriated to the Department of Defense” (GAO-08-311, 2008, p 1). The GAO report 
noted the DoD primary focus and expenditure of funds is directed at the homeland 
defense mission.   
The NG is traditionally included in the federal missions as the NG personnel are 
trained to fight wars and focus on the homeland defense mission.  It is in this area that the 
NG receives its primary funding from the federal government. As a result, the civil 
support mission is traditionally not a high priority and receives little concern or emphasis. 
Karen Guttieri, author of the article entitled Strategic Insight, Homeland Security and US 
Civil-Military Relations, supports this point, “The US military traditionally has been 
uncomfortable contemplating domestic operations” (2003, p. 3).   
The Gilmore Commission Reports, published in 2003, recommended that the 
DoD develop a list of missions on which to train the military, and more specifically, the 
NG.  The fifth commission report states:  
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Furthermore, there should be a well-coordinated, clearly defined set of 
roles and missions for the military, including the National Guard, under 
which the military is expected to support state and local government in 
response to terrorism, as well as other hazards. (Gilmore Commission 
Report, 2003, p. 390)   
With these roles and missions clarified, the military could then develop and 
implement education programs to ready units to accomplish these missions and roles.   
5. Appropriate Use of Federal Funds 
Congress has enacted laws that control how funds are spent. The Anti-Deficiency 
Act is one law that specifies how funds are to be used.  Under its provisions, any use of 
federal funds for any purpose other than what the finds were appropriated for constitutes 
a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. 3 This restriction prevents the use of federal funds 
for state missions or for purposes other than their intended use. Congress has enacted 
statutes that prohibit the DoD, including the NG, from supplementing its funds from non-
appropriated sources.  Before the NG could use funds from other sources, e.g., state 
funds, NG personnel would have to be placed under a different duty status.  For example, 
if the state were to provide funds for training, the NG personnel would have to be in State 
Active Duty status to perform the training, not in a federal status.  NG can only train state 
missions in state status and federal mission in federal status.  However, because it cannot 
train in a federal status, this results in the need for additional weekends of training.   
Funding is also a contributor to the gap.  Part of the problem is in the way money 
is authorized and allocated; little to none of it is used for the civil support mission to 
support the states. The funding the NG receives is designated for the homeland defense 
missions.  The Gilmore Commission Report Number Four supports this point with this 
recommendation:   
That the congress expressly authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide 
funds to the governor of a State when such funds are requested for civil 
support planning, training, exercising and operations by National Guard 
                                                 
3  Anti-Deficiencies Act is a law that congress uses to control the expenditure of federal funds.  It 
provides guidance on what is and is not legal or authorized spending procedures.  It also provides penalties 
for violation.   
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personnel acting in Title 32 duty status and that the Secretary of Defense 
collaborate with State governors to develop agreed lists of National Guard 
civil support activities for which the Defense Department will provide 
funds. (2002, p. 99)  
If the collaboration with the state governors were to happen, or if the funds could 
be used for the NG to train on missions for homeland security or civil support, this 
education gap would be reduced.  
The NG is funded almost exclusively from the federal government for both 
equipment and pay.  The area where the state pays a part is in the facilities; the state owns 
the land the armories sit on and pays up to 25 percent of the construction costs and a 
portion of the armory maintenance, but these responsibilities can be waived by the federal 
government.  Due to this funding support from the federal government, the focus of the 
NG is driven by the federal funding guidance, concurrently causing its focus to be also on 
the federal mission of homeland defense.   
6. DHS and DoD Have not Collaborated on Common Missions  
DHS has not provided DoD with the necessary missions it expects the military to 
conduct when responding to any requests for homeland security or civil support.  Without 
guidance or direction from higher headquarters, subordinate headquarters are left to 
determine for themselves what are valid missions or tasks.  Without direction from DHS 
and DoD, many states are accepting state missions that may not meet this criteria.  Each 
state makes its own determinations, some of which may be outside permissible 
parameters.  The following statement from the GAO reinforces this point:  
DoD concurred with our recommendation to establish the full range of the 
National Guard’s homeland missions, to identify the capabilities needed to 
perform those missions and develop a plan to address any shortfalls, and 
to establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard’s homeland 
security missions. (GAO-05-21, 2004, p. 31-32)  
Without guidance, the NG cannot assess its readiness or develop the education 
requirements to ready the NG leadership to accomplish its missions.  
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In 2001, the Gilmore Commission found that DoD was waiting for DHS to 
establish the requirements for military support in homeland security; DHS has not done 
as of 2008.  In Appendix K of Statuses of Previous Advisory Panel Recommendations, 
from the category of “Role of Military,” the following supports this statement, “To date 
(2001) there have been no requirements established by DHS for the military to support 
homeland security missions” (Gilmore Commission, 2001, p. K-12).  In addition, in 2002 
the Gilmore Commission declared, “According to DoD, NORTHCOM cannot conduct 
comprehensive planning for civil support until DHS establishes civil support 
requirements” (Gilmore Commission Appendix K, 2002, p. K-12-13).  The Commission 
on the National Guard and Reserves continues to find that DoD and DHS have not 
included the NG in the planning for civil support responses:   
The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security 
have not yet acted adequately to integrate DoD and NG Leadership into 
national preparedness and response planning activities. (Commission on 
the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 13) 
When DHS was asked by members of the GAO for an explanation of the 
reluctance to commit resources, its response was:   
DHS and planning team officials explained that DHS coordination plans 
consider National Guard forces to be either a part of the state response 
effort or the federal DOD response effort and that the state or DOD would 
conduct this detailed planning.  DHS’s role is to provide guidance and 
recommendations for states and federal agencies to consider and it does 
not have authority to direct the state or other federal agencies to perform 
specific emergency response duties. (GAO-08-311, 2008. p 15)  
DHS maintains that the planning and preparation of NG missions and readiness 
for those missions is the requirement for DoD or for the states.  Such a viewpoint seems 
odd, perhaps because they do not understand the process for response.  One would think 
if DHS is in charge of responses as the lead federal agency, it would want to have input 
concerning the planning and education of its response elements.  In short, neither DHS 
nor DoD appear eager to take on the responsibility of providing resources or training of 
the NG in civil support, homeland security, and disaster response missions.   
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The guidelines from the Gilmore Commissions and Commission on the National 
Guard and Reserves are very beneficial for the NG.  If the recommendations can be 
implemented, this information can be used to establish appropriate education and training 
requirements for NG leaders.  While the NG already has developed regulations and 
procedures for DSCA in a vacuum, the development of civil support mission 
requirements and training missions has stopped at the federal level.  Consequently, no 
direction is currently available to guide the NG support for the states and local authorities 
in civil support.  A GAO report emphasized this point, “…readiness for homeland 
security missions is unknown because DoD has not fully defined requirements for 
homeland security missions nor establishes readiness standards and measured for them” 
(GAO-04-670T, 2004, p. 2).  The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves noted 
in this report that DHS has yet to provide DoD with the requirements needed for mission 
analysis by DoD; “DHS has not demonstrated a commitment to assuming its 
responsibility as the lead agency for identifying the requirement that the DoD must meet 
to adequately perform domestic civil support missions” (Commission on the National 
Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 13).  Before the NG is ready to respond with increased 
success for civil support missions, the NG must have definitively defined requirements 
for homeland security missions and understand the civilian environment in which it will 
operate.  
The argument can be made that because of the involvement of the military forces, 
that DoD should take the lead and inform DHS what the military will do for missions and 
direct the training of units that would support civilian authorities, rather than waiting for 
responses or being directed by DHS.  This raises the issue about DoD staying out of the 
disaster response missions and instead focusing on the homeland defense mission.   
7. DoD/Services Controls and/or Determines the Education Priorities  
DoD determines the doctrine, and in order to comply with that doctrine, each 




components have determined that the education and training requirements must be the 
same for not only the active duty military branches, but also for the Reserve and NG. 
According to the GAO:   
DoD generally organizes, trains, and equips the National Guard for only 
the federal missions it leads.  …As a result, National Guard forces that 
may have to take on homeland security missions are not organized, trained 
or equipped specifically for these missions. (GAO-04-670T, 2004, p. 14)   
Current federal training requirements and programs restrict or take precedence 
over the few available homeland security or civil support educational opportunities 
provided for the NG to obtain this needed education. DoD/service components have 
focused on training programs for the homeland defense mission and have not determined 
what, if any, training is needed for civil support missions. At the present time, few civil 
support training programs are available to either the NG or other components of the 
military. Furthermore, whatever knowledge or experience is needed to overcome this 
shortfall generally has been learned on-the-job during civil support responses. Lessons 
learned through past responses have shown that this type of learning is not effective nor 
is the desired method to develop disaster preparedness.  
The NGB receives funds for the development of training programs from the 
Departments of the Army and Air Force. Most training funds are used to send NG 
personnel to existing training programs, which focus on homeland defense missions. 
Because funds for the development of new training are limited, NGB J7 (the joint 
training branch) must determine the priority for funding training needs. When funding is 
reduced, the priorities change and guidelines emerge, restricting what programs will be 
funded; these are usually the federal efforts. The focus on the federal mission is a natural 
and normal follow-up to the funding source, as the NGB is tasked to provide personnel to 
accomplish the federal homeland defense mission through funds appropriated by the 
federal government.   
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8. New Mission Requires Non-Traditional Military Education   
Performing homeland security missions will require educational processes and 
techniques different from those currently used to educate the NG leadership. This non-
customary training is in contrast to the current “go to war” training. According to the 
GAO:  
Some homeland security missions could require training and equipment, 
such as decontamination training and equipment that differ from that 
provided to support war-fighting missions. …National Guard personnel 
may lack the type of training and equipment that would facilitate an 
effective and timely response to future homeland security threats. (GAO-
05-21, 2004, p. 4-5) 
The GAO report continued on with the following comments that support its 
recommendation:   
NG forces may be expected to perform missions that differ greatly form 
their warfighting or traditional state missions and may require different 
equipment, training, and specialized capabilities than they currently 
possess.  Homeland missions, such as providing large-scale critical 
infrastructure protection or responding to weapons of mass destruction 
events in the United States, could differ substantially from conditions 
expected on the battle field or from more traditional state mission, such as 
responding to natural disaster or civil disturbances. (GAO-05-21, 2004, p. 
26)  
This statement pointed out that GAO sees a difference in education needs between 
homeland defense and the civil support mission.   
The following excerpt from the GAO stresses the point about the control of 
education priorities, in addition to other relevant points:   
Efforts to restructure the National Guard are focused on its primary federal 
mission and do not address the individual state Guard’s critical role in 
homeland security.  As noted earlier, DOD planning and resourcing for 
National Guard units has assumed that homeland security tasks can be 
accomplished with personnel and equipment supplied for the wartime 
mission.  However, in the new security environment, the assumption that 
Guard units can perform their domestic mission with personnel and 
equipment trained for overseas missions needs is questionable. (GAO-04-
670T, 2004, p. 21) 
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This assessment indicates that any change in mission will require changes in 
education of NG leadership. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves noted 
the lack of DoD programming or budgeting for NG use in the civil support or domestic 
mission. The commission was critical of DoD’s apparent assumption that the wartime 
mission can be transferred to domestic missions. It stated, “Department of Defense has 
neither explicitly programmed and budgeted for civil support missions nor adequately 
equipped the National Guard for its domestic missions, relying on the flawed assumption 
that they are derivative of its wartime missions” (Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserves, 2008, p. 13).  The DoD has the philosophy that the homeland defense mission 
training and its funding are sufficient to cover the civil support missions. In 2008, a 
Government Accounting Office report addressed this point with the following:  
DOD does not engage in planning to identify the resources required for the 
National Guard’s civil support mission because it assumes most of those 
needs can be met with its warfighting capabilities and that planning to 
identify requirements for state-led missions is the states responsibility. 
(GAO-08-311, 2008, p. 4) 
DoD assumes the traditional war-fighting mission and new missions of civil 
support are the same or similar enough that additional training or education are not 
needed, which several commissions or agencies do not agree with.   
The Gilmore Commission (2003) listed many recommendations, several of which 
were directed at the DoD. One of the more noteworthy recommendations the commission 
suggested was that the SecDef institute specific civil support training for NG units which 
are involved in support of civilian authorities, “We recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense direct specific new mission area for the use of the National Guard for providing 
support to civil authorities for combating terrorism” (Gilmore Commission, 2001, p. x).  
The Gilmore Commission noted a shortfall in education or training for the NG even as 
the focus then was just on terrorism; the same still holds true as the NG focuses on all 
hazards.  Moreover, the commission recommended that the NG expand its involvement in 
civil support exercises at all levels:   
We further recommend that the secretary direct the military departments to 
institute specific training in military units most likely to be involved in 
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military support to civil authorities and to expand military involvement in 
related exercises with Federal, State, and local agencies (Gilmore 
Commission, 2001, p.51).   
If the training the Gilmore Commission addresses were to occur this would help 
the NG to understand the problem and develop the necessary education.   
9. Available Time for Education  
The NG’s recent transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve 
brings a strain on the NG members as each member must balance the time commitments 
required by the military, civilian careers, and family needs. In order to maintain 
equilibrium for the NG member, it is imperative to consider education that meets the 
requirements of the military, but still offers reasonable time for the NG member to 
remain at the civilian job and with the family. Accordingly, education must be 
appropriately planned by DoD to meet these criteria—needs of the military, but 
consideration for the individuals.  Performing additional education or training requires 
Guardsmen to commit more time away from their families or from their full-time job, 
which is often difficult for them to do or justify, some will not do the additional 
education therefore not solving the problem. 
Due to the on-going war, the current deployment rates have taken their toll on the 
NG members.  Many NG members have been deployed for overseas service and have 
returned to be mobilized for civil support missions.  The families, employers, and soldiers 
are experiencing many strains and stresses due to extra time commitments.   
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter identified and explored the existing gaps in NG disaster response 
education.  The first section explored the NG history, mission and duty status.  One of the 
gaps in NG preparedness is the lack of education available to the NG concerning 
homeland security or civil support missions.  It is worth noting that most of the current 
available courses address the federal mission support requirements and not those at the 
state level, which compounds the gap.  Correlating influences that contribute to this gap 
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in education are the current funding requirements, current policies, and new or changing 
missions. One GAO report opposed the DoD’s viewpoint that the current education and 
training for the homeland defense mission is sufficient for the homeland security mission 
and recommended changes in training specifically directed to homeland security.  
Understanding the causes for the gap in education points to ways in which to eliminate or 
reduce it.   
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III. SURVEY AND INTERVIEW DATA 
The first part of this data collection consisted of surveys conducted with the NG 
Directors of Military Support (DOMS), NGB personnel, and recent graduates of the 
Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program.  The NG DOMS were 
selected as a survey group as they are the most knowledgeable in the NG in the area of 
homeland security, civil support, and DSCA. The recent graduates of the Naval 
Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program were queried for their views on 
the course to determine the strengths, weaknesses, and benefits.   
The second part of the data collection consisted of interview with the NG advisor 
to the Chief of Staff for NORTHCOM to understand their perspective and the United 
States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) was interviewed in order to clarify NG’s use 
of federal funds. 
A. SURVEY OF DOMS 
This survey explores what NG DOMS officers from across the country and NGB 
representatives view as important topics for educating the NG leadership concerning 
homeland security. The DOMS, who are the NG experts in each state on homeland 
security issues, were asked their opinions on educational topics dealing with the response 
and preparation for NG deployment to disasters. National Guard Bureau Current 
Operations (J3) and Training Branch (J7) personnel were included on the survey with the 
DOMS as well.  Two surveys were used for this data collection. The first survey directed 
questions to the DOMS regarding each state’s NG viewpoints on the need of education 
for NG forces in the areas of homeland security, civil support, and DSCA. Twenty of the 
50 DOMS responded, resulting in a response rate of 40 percent. The second survey 
delved deeper into the DOMS’ understanding of the need for the education: if there is a 
gap or not; why, where, and how the education should be conducted; and who should 
receive the education.   
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B. SURVEY OF NPS NG CERTIFICATE PROGRAM GRADUATES 
A survey was conducted of the graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School 
National Guard Certificate pilot program.  The states of Missouri and Arizona were the 
two states that offered the pilot program and had a combined total of 19 students who 
completed the class.  Five respondents completed the survey, a 26 percent return. Their 
overall assessment of the program was very positive.   
C. INTERVIEW OF USNORTHCOM ADVISOR  
The author conducted an interview with the NG Advisor to the Chief of Staff for 
NORTHCOM to discuss his perspective on education topics for homeland security for 
the NG.  The advisor not only shared his perspective on NG involvement with DoD’s 
primary homeland security proponent, NORTHCOM, but he also responded to questions 
concerning what educational topics the NG should emphasize for the leadership to study 
in order to accomplish the emerging homeland security, civil support, and DSCA 
missions. These responses provide a glimpse into the current mindset of NORTHCOM 
regarding the sort of education the NG should receive in preparation for the homeland 
security and civil support missions.  He articulated that in order to achieve a successful 
operation by all participants responding to an incident, prior relationships must be 
developed and fostered so all involved, particularly the NG, can understand the system or 
differences in processes. He reiterated the need for NG leadership to know and 
understand the developing theme of homeland security topics.   
D. INTERVIEW WITH USPFO-NE 
An interview was conducted with the United States Property and Fiscal Officer 
(USPFO). Each state has a USPFO who is viewed as the in-state resident expert on 
money policy. The USPFO is a Title 10 officer assigned to each state and territory at the 
NG Joint Forces Headquarters (state NG headquarters) to oversee the management and 
control of federal funds, equipment, and facilities for the federal government.  
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E. SURVEY AND INTERVIEW DATA   
The following are the results of the survey and interview data by topics. The 
topics will be used throughout this thesis. The numbers in the tables (see tables below) 
indicate the percentage of individuals who chose that response. 
1. Educational Topics and Levels  
• Q1: What educational topics should the National Guard emphasize for the 
leadership to accomplish the emerging homeland security and defense 
support for civil authorities (civil support) missions?   
The responses to this question indicated that there is a need to understand the 
state, as well as the federal process for response, specifically in these areas:  JFHQ-State, 
State specific Emergency Management structures, EMAC, Stafford Act, Anti deficiency 
Act, Role of NGB, Another respondent commented on the FEMA Independent Study (IS) 
courses and the ability to be certified in emergency management:   
FEMA offers a series of IS courses work that leads to a certification in 
emergency management.  Would recommend TAG down to DOMS take 
much of if not [all to] obtain the certification.  It provides great insight 
into the understanding of how civil agencies are going to plan and respond 
to events.   
One respondent suggested the topic of policy and legislation for homeland 
security/homeland defense and roles and responsibilities for all levels of government 
agencies; an understanding of these areas would improve the response by the military.   
What the DOMS stressed is the NG leadership must first be educated on the 
processes utilized at the state and federal levels for civil support missions, specifically 
defense support of civil authorities, before it can provide disaster response with desired 
efficiency and fully coordinated within the civilian parameters of management and 
control.  The NG must understand the lines of authority as derived from the Constitution 
concerning the national strategies, the implications of the NRF, the Stafford Act, the 




Stafford Act and Economy Act are two laws that directly affect how the federal 
government responses in a disaster response; this also affects the response of the state and 
state agencies.   
• Q2: What changes or additions in the formal education should Department 
of Defense make to educate the National Guard to meet its emerging 
homeland security and defense support for civil authorities (civil support) 
role?   
This question focused on the specifics of DoD education to include changes to 
meet the emerging role.  The respondents indicated, “exercises with the state and local 
government rather than in a vacuum”. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents indicated a 
need for a course for this new mission: “They should develop a separate course, or series 
of courses.  It should also be focused on middle and senior leadership, the people who are 
making the policy decisions and are the interface between the military and state 
governments.” One respondent wanted to bring back a course NGB taught that covered 
the DOMS area.  The last respondent indicated there should be doctrine on the immediate 
response and difference between the different status; the respondent argued:   
Officer and NCO leader development courses should begin to include 
immediate response doctrine and the differences between Title 10, 32 and 
SAD.  This should also be part of active duty course work also.  ICS, 
NIMS, and the federal response framework would be great additions to 
intermediate und upper level educational courses like ILE [Intermediate 
Level Education]. 
Each state’s NG DOMS and NGB representatives were asked to address the 
educational topics and instructional courses that should belong in a course along with 
their level of importance for inclusion in a homeland security educational program for the 
NG.  Each participant was asked to rank criteria from one to five (one being highest 
priority) based on importance to NG leadership.  Table 1 below lists the results in priority 
order.  The numbers in the boxes indicate percentage of respondents that chose that level 



















35% 50% 5% 5% 5% 1 
Homeland security doctrine, 
policy, structure, purpose 
35% 45% 10% 5% 5% 2 
Roles of federal, local, and 
state organizations in 
homeland security 
35% 35% 20% 0% 10% 3 
Strategic planning for 
homeland security 
35% 35% 15% 15% 0% 4 
Terrorism 25% 45% 20% 5% 5% 5 
Homeland security issues, 
duty status, laws, regulations 




20% 50% 20% 5% 5% 7 
Intelligence 20% 40% 25% 10% 5% 8 
Exercise planning 10% 50% 35% 0% 10% 9 
Technology in homeland 
security 
10% 50% 20% 20% 0% 10 
Special topics such as border 
security, pubic health, Islam 
10% 25% 50% 15% 0% 11 
Each DOMS was provided the option to list other areas that they felt were 
important, resulting in the following list (not in any specific order):   
• Training and response;  
• Emergency response (all hazard);  
• Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC);  
• Intelligence oversight;  
• Search and rescue (SAR);  
• Community support;  
• Joint Operations Center (JOC) operations;  
• National Guard Bureau (NGB) communications  
• Joint Terrorism Taskforce (JTTF) interface;  
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• Chemical biological radiation, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD);  
• State intelligence fusion centers  
• The importance of NG personnel completing the ICS (Incident Command 
System) course;  
• CBRNE planning and preparation.   
• Q3: What specific educational areas do you believe should be addressed in 
leadership preparations for National Guard members supporting homeland 
security activities/missions?   
Forty percent of the respondents indicated a requirement for education in NIMS, 
25 percent of the respondents indicated a need for a course for the DOMS in DSCA, 15 
percent mentioned a need to understand the role and relationship with NORTHCOM, 10 
percent indicated a need to understand the NRF, and 10 percent referred back to question 
on education topics.  Although the responses may seem random, they point out the vast 
array of topics that are of concern to the DOMS.  In responding to the need for courses, 
one respondent indicated a need for a course early in the NG career due to the importance 
of the mission:   
We need to have courses that solders can start taking early in their career 
that deal with Domestic Operations.  Just like being a infantry soldier, 
there are courses that prepare you for each phase of your career, we have 
nothing for one of the most important roles we play as National Guard 
Soldiers.  
This response points out that DOMS understand a need for education for the NG 
in homeland security and civil support.  A respondent addressed the need for an updated 
curriculum or recertification to maintain proficiency and to understand the domestic 
operational law and stated, “There is no updated curriculum or ‘recertification’ that 
occurs to maintain any level of proficiency.  …More training and awareness on domestic 
operational law should be a fundamental aspect of any DSCA training—not just for 
SJA/JAG [military lawyers].” This touches on another point about curriculum 
accreditation, which is lacking for a uniform standard.  Another responder indicated a 40 
or more hour course was needed; the respondent argued, “A 40–80 hour course that 
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covers all subjects indentified in [Table 1] above.  The course should be designed and 
tailored to leaders/planners at the Operational and Tactical levels.” One other respondent 
indicated a requirement for “a thorough understanding of the Constitution.”   
• Q4: What specific educational areas do you believe should be addressed in 
leadership preparation for National Guard members supporting defense 
support to civil authorities in missions or activities?   
Responses ranged from needing partnership and relationship building to 
joint/interagency coordination, consequence management, exercise design, and incident 
command system. Another respondent stressed the support side to the missions for the 
military, by pointing out that “ICS is the first and most important with the realization that 
National Guard and DOD is supporting and NOT running it.”   
• Q5: What other areas or topic would you add to this program? (This and 
the next two questions refer to the NPS NG Certificate Program) 
While one respondent indicated that he “would not change anything,” while 
others wanted about more terrorism, national security, and counter terrorism.  On the 
topics pertaining to terrorism, one suggested more time on the threat and motivation of 
terrorists.  Another respondent added the topics of NIMS and NRP as important.   
• Q6: In your understanding, are there areas of homeland security in which 
more education is needed?  What are the areas? 
One hundred percent of the respondents indicated there is a need for more 
education as NG leadership does not “get it,” and the civilian sector does not understand 
the role of the NG.  The following quotations provide an insight to their perceptions of 
the problem. One respondent articulated, “Absolutely. I don't think the average M-Day 
[mobilization day, traditional NG member] commander has the right knowledge of their 
role in HS and the importance of being prepared for that mission—especially in large 
scale responses such as pandemics or regional outbreaks / terrorists / catastrophic 
occurrences.”  Another respondent commented that homeland security education needed 
more focus; the respondent indicated, “All areas of Homeland Security should be given 
more educational focus.”   
• Q7: In your understanding, are there areas of DSCA in which more 
education is needed?  If so, what are the areas?   
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One hundred percent of the respondents indicated that there were more areas in 
which education is needed, such as in exercises, the command and control process, 
definition of the responsibilities, and intelligence sharing.  The following quote by one 
respondent identified what they all thought the junior officers needed, which was an 
understanding of DSCA.  The respondent indicated, “I think this is an important area that 
company level guard leadership should have some understanding of.”  The other quote 
indicated that because the “traditional members of the Guard” presently do not 
understand DSCA, they should receive the education in order to understand it.  The 
respondent explained:   
I'm confident in saying that the majority of our traditional members in the 
Guard, at least on the Air side of the house, are not familiar with DSCA at 
all.  This is a major problem that could be easily be addressed through the 
ancillary training program.   
• Q8: During the NORTHCOM interview, the following question was 
asked:  What educational topics should the National Guard emphasize for 
the leadership to accomplish the emerging homeland security and military 
support for civil authorities (civil support) missions?   
He responded: 
Recognize the importance of developing sound working relationships with 
mission partners before an event.  Learn and understand cultural 
differences that can prevent successful collaboration, communication, and 
coordination with mission partners.  How military leaders (DCOs, JTF 
Commanders (State and Federal), JTF staff members (State and Federal), 
JDOMS/DOMS, etc. can garner/solicit support from mission partners to 
conduct successful interagency operations. 
Understand and become familiar with HSPD-5, HSPD-8, National 
Response Framework (NRF), National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS), Integrated Planning System 
(IPS), Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS), National Homeland 
Security Strategy, and National Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support. 
He pointed out the need for the NG to have effective interoperability with its 
civilian counterparts and to understand how they operate.  This understanding would 
improve the NG response, and while the education programs are improving, a shortfall 
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that still exists in educating “military members” on the state process.  He went on to list 
topics for education, most of which have been listed before as important.  In addition, he 
did bring up the point of understanding the national strategy for homeland security, 
defense, and civil support.   
• Q9: What changes or additions in the formal education should the 
Department of Defense make to educate the National Guard to meet its 
emerging homeland security and military support for civil authorities 
(civil support) role?   
He responded: 
All DOD members who may be involved in conducting DSCA missions or 
those who conduct interagency coordination should be required to 
complete FEMA courses on ICS, NRF, NIMS, and MACS.  Additionally, 
completion of the ARNORTH conducted DSCA course should be 
mandatory for all DOD personnel who may have a potential role in 
conducting DSCA operations. 
Rather than incorporate into service school curricula, DOD should 
consider offering incentives for service members to complete on-line and 
residence courses already offered by DHS and FEMA.   
While these recommended courses would be excellent for NG leadership, the 
drawback of these courses is that they only cover the federal process and do not address 
the state level process.  The state process should be developed in order to give the NG 
leadership a better understanding of both the federal and state processes during a 
response.  This point was mentioned in other survey answers.   
• Q10: At what educational levels(s) do you believe this education programs 
should be provided to be most effective for the National Guard in your 
state e.g., certificate, associate, undergraduate, or graduate level and why?   
The following were the responses to this question (Table 2):  
Table 2.   Educational Level   
Associates Bachelor Certificate Graduate Combination 
of all four 
None No 
answer
10% 10% 30% 25% 15% 5% 5% 
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Seventy percent of respondents selected an advance degree.  Ninety percent of the 
respondents indicated there is a need for a degree program. One respondent had an 
interesting observation based on his experience about NG leadership becoming more 
interested when they are exposed to this education; they want to learn more.  The 
respondent indicated that:  
I believe it is a mix of all four.  I have not found people interested in HLS 
when openly approached, however when they are exposed then they 
become such more interested.  So I believe that a program structured with 
certification on through graduate level would be the most successful.   
A reason why this respondent indicated an advance degree was best might be due 
to the NG leadership having degrees already and the time requirement for an advanced 
degree is quicker with a certificate or graduate degree than a bachelor’s degree.  Another 
respondent indicated a certificate program would be best due to the fact that “staff 
positions for our Domestic Operations branch rotate frequently”.  This may be due to the 
Army culture, which moves officers every two to three years; the Army officers in 
DOMS positions would normally be the majority of the occupants.  A certificate would 
be the fastest degree option for participants to obtain due to the quick rotation.  This 
again may be due to the limited time requirement to obtain a degree.   
• Q11: Should DoD teach this material in their education programs or 
should public or private colleges and universities teach this more 
effectively? 
The following were the responses to this question (Table 3): 
Table 3.   DoD or Public/Private Colleges/Universities Teach the Course?   
Public or private DoD Both No option 
15% 42% 28% 15% 
A respondent who selected a public system touched on the point that the NGB 
should be the lead agency, as active duty does not see the state level response and 
therefore does not understand the process, respondent indicated.  He stated, 
“Public/private universities would be more effective.  If done by DoD, NGB should be 
the proponent, as the active component does not understand how the majority of 
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situations, those which do not elevate above state level, are handled.” Another respondent 
indicated that DoD should be the agency responsible to instill the education and include a 
additional skill identifier, and stated “DoD courses as introduction. ASI [additional skill 
identifier] could be another mechanism to get the knowledge into our work force.”   
• Q12: How willing would you be, personally, to work on a bachelor’s 
degree in homeland security?   
The following were the responses to this question (Table 4): 















5% 0% 20% 30% 40% 5% 
A reason for the low rating could be that all officers in the NG are required to 
have a bachelor’s degree; the DOMS are senior officers and would already have a degree.  
Five percent of the recipients were interested in a bachelor’s degree and 70 percent had 
little interest.   
• Q13: In your opinion, how willing would members of the National Guard 
in your state be willing to work on a bachelor’s degree in homeland 
security?   
The following were the responses to this question (Table 5): 













10% 15% 45% 20% 10% 
This question inquired as to DOMS opinion whether or not the other NG 
members would be interested in a bachelor’s degree.  Again, the priority was low; most 
of the enlisted have a bachelor’s degree by the time they are in leadership positions.   
• Q14: How willing would you be, personally, to work on a master’s degree 
in homeland security?   
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The following were the responses to this question (Table 6): 













25% 15% 20% 10% 30% 
The numbers and percentages improve when asked about earning a master’s 
degree, and the percentages are evenly split between a priority and not a priority. In the 
military there is no requirement to obtain a master’s degree. Some states may use a 
master’s degree as a preferential factor in placement for positions. Those who have 
worked in the field of homeland security may understand the need for more in depth 
education.   
• Q15: In your opinion, how willing would members of the National Guard 
in your state be to work on a master’s degree in homeland security?   
The following were the responses to this question (Table 7): 













10% 25% 30% 20% 15% 
The numbers improve, indicating the respondents believed the priority for 
members in the state is to obtain a master’s degree.  This might be due to the potential 
benefit gained for the traditional NG members, as their civilian employers may view 
them more favorably because of the higher education.  A reason for only modest support 
for the masters program may be due to the fact that all officers are required to have a 
bachelor’s degree and there is little benefit for NG leadership to obtain a higher degree.   
2. Gaps in Education 
• Q16: Do you see a gap in education between DSCA, HLS, and the “go to 
war” missions? What are the gaps?   
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The respondents to this question indicated a gap exists.  The following quotations 
express their points of view on this question:  
• More emphasis on the ‘go to war’ education.  That makes DSCA/HLS less 
important or a ‘side-bar’ to many.   
• There is no formal education for DOMS in the NG.  That is the gap.   
• Missions that may be assigned via HLS may be quite different from the 
typical training of ‘go to war’ missions.  Unit type coding and training 
need to include potential missions for DSCA/MSCA.   
• Yes. Gap lies in formal DHS sponsored education given to military 
officials.  Can't play DSCA if you don't know the rules.  
• Civil-military interface and the understanding of being in a support role.   
• Q17: What do you see as the reason for this gap? 
This question brought out short and pointed responses like the following:   
• Funding is based on ‘go to war’ mission and not DSCA/MSCA.   
• No DoD emphasis on readiness for DSCA at unit level.   
• Lack of experience by senior active Army leaders.  
The last respondent touched on the issues of the force behind the military 
education, the war-fight mission, and the lack of understanding of the NG other missions.  
The respondent argued:   
Our military education is based on fighting an enemy and being the 
responsible agency for taking that fight to the enemy, AKA Title 10. DoD 
drives training and has for years to serve that purpose.  The military does 
not necessarily understand how to be a partner in response, Title 32 or 
SAD.  DoD policy makers are Title 10 focused and have no provisions for 
the guard to be the lead in this effort.   
• Q18: Do you have suggestions on how to reduce or eliminate this gap? 
This question gave a few glimpses of potential solutions, such as re-establishing 
the training that the NGB had previously provided for the DOMS, funding training for 
the HLS mission, making the training mandatory, and having additional Title 10 slots for 
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NG leaders.  One respondent indicated the changes in the Defense Authorization Act are 
on the right track. This respondent stated, “Recent changes in the FY08 Defense 
Authorization are the way ahead, and I would say that CNGB [Chief of National Guard 
Bureau] must be a voting member of Joint Staff.”  
• Q19: The following question was asked during the NORTHCOM 
interview: Do you see a shortfall in the education for the National Guard 
in responding to homeland security missions? If so, in what areas? If not 
why?   
Below is his response:   
Yes, but it is improving. The biggest shortfall in education is learning how 
to conduct successful interagency operations for domestic incidents with 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. This is a huge 
challenge for most military members because they do not understand how 
their civilian counterparts train and organize for preparedness (pre-event) 
and response (post-event) activities in the homeland. Although we all have 
an interest in saving lives, minimizing suffering, and protecting critical 
infrastructure, our cultures, terminology, and doctrine are different. 
He pointed out the need for the NG to have effective interoperability with its 
civilian counterparts and to understand how they operate. This understanding will 
improve the NG response, but as he pointed out, while the education programs are 
improving, a shortfall still exists in educating “military members” on the state process.  
He went on to point out there are differences in culture, terminology, and doctrine.   
3. NPS NG Certificate Program   
• Q20: What benefit do you anticipate having completed from this program?   
The respondents indicated that they gained a better knowledge, understanding, 
and appreciation for the missions of homeland security and civil support. Forty percent 
indicated a competitive advantage, such as “12 hours towards a post graduate degree,” as 
benefits of completion of this program. One respondent anticipated now having a better 
understanding of the issues and how to better provide the support. The respondent 
indicated; “Having a better working knowledge of homeland security and the issues 
surrounding it. Understanding support to civil authorities more.” Another anticipated 
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understanding the role in homeland security and the future missions, stating, “Better 
understanding of the role the ARNG [Army National Guard] plays in Homeland Security 
and better chance of ‘doing the right thing’ to support that mission in future 
assignments.” Having a better understanding for the complexity of homeland security and 
homeland defense was anticipated by one participant, who stated, “I now have a much 
greater appreciation for the complexity of HLDS [homeland defense and security].”   
• Q21: Would you recommend this program to other members of your state? 
When the graduates were asked the question, their responses were 
overwhelmingly positive. One hundred percent responded in a yes or stronger.  For 
example, one exclaimed, “Absolutely!!! It’s vital our leaders (officers and Sr. NCOs) 
understand the importance of their mission and are planning ahead to ensure a quick 
response when our communities need us.” Another respondent indicated respondent 
learned there was a lot to learn when exposed to the education.  He remarked, “Without 
question.  I didn't realize how ignorant I was in my understanding of HLDS until I 
completed this program.”  
• Q22: Would you recommend this program to other states?   
The responses were the same; 100 percent responded positively.  One indicated 
there is a benefit for senior leaders in the NG as well: “Yes. This course is very beneficial 
for any senior leadership in the guard.”   
• Q23: Because of this course, are you better equipped to perform homeland 
security mission in your state? In what ways did this course accomplish 
this? 
One hundred percent of the respondents indicated “yes” they are better able to 
perform the homeland security and civil support missions in their state after completion 
of this course.  The accomplishments were, as leaders, they had a better understanding of 
the “why” during the event; the “complexities and concepts,” including the understanding 
of the “interdependence” of all levels of responders; and the military process for support.  
One respondent indicated this helped him to “think outside the military box” He stated,  
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“Yes. The course explained the various participants in homeland security, opened 
perspectives and caused us to think outside the military box to develop and resolve 
issues.”   
• Q24: Did this course help you to understand the Guard’s role in homeland 
security? In what ways did the course do this?   
One hundred percent of the respondents indicated, yes, they have a better 
understanding of the NG role in homeland security. The course expanded their 
knowledge of the NG role in homeland security, the border security issues, the NGO 
[non-governmental organizations] involvement and the understanding of the civilian 
hierarchy, lines of communication and authority, as well as the limitations of the NG.   
• Q25: Because of this course, are you better equipped to perform Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission in your state?  In what ways 
did this course accomplish this? 
Eighty percent answered, “Yes, without question.” The remaining 20 percent gave 
an indication that they better understand the concepts and role of DSCA. One respondent 
gained an understanding of the insight into the military’s role as well as the public’s “lean 
toward the military for order” view; the respondent stated, “Yes. The NIMS course and 
understanding the support role of the ARNG in DSCA was important.  The public always 
leans toward the military for order, discipline and direction which is contrary to this 
mission.” Another respondent indicated a better understanding the knowledge to mission 
accomplishment; the respondent explained, “Yes. I now understand the roles, abilities 
and restraints of the many participants. This knowledge is key to accomplishing 
missions.”   
• Q26: Did this course help you to understand the Guard’s role in defense 
support of civil authorities?  In what ways did the course accomplish this?   
Again, 80 percent responded “yes,” and 20 percent indicated the belief that the 
class discussion could have been expanded further.  One respondent indicated a better 




“We talked about so many things from Pandemic Influenza to natural disasters.  Missouri 
has experienced their share of ‘state emergencies’ in recent years.  This course helped 
explain why we were there and how we fit in.”   
• Q27: Any other comments or observations about this course? 
Eighty percent responded to this question with favorable comments. One 
respondent stressed that the students must understand the time commitment needed for 
this certificate program and indicated:   
Ensure students understand the commitment they're making.  We had 
almost a 50% drop rate from the start of the course between Phoenix and 
Springfield. A few were for deployments. Most were for lack of time 
and/or keeping up with assignments...  
The other respondents gave a variety of comments regarding the value and need 
for this program. For example, one said, “I really enjoyed this class and I have benefited 
from it in many ways.  I hope that your state would see the benefits as well.  Good luck”  
Another respondent indicated that he understood that the program was being “canceled” 
and that such cancellation will be a mistake, as he explained:   
I believe it was Gen. McKinley that stated that ‘Defending our homeland 
is job one’ Yet, as I understand it, the NGB has cancelled funding for this 
program. I think that is a critical mistake that we will pay for down the 
road.   
One respondent stated this program should be directed towards those NG officers 
working in the DOMS area: “Yes. I think this should be encouraged for National Guard 
Officers especially those working in the DOMS or those type of positions.”  
Their responses indicated the need and desire for more education and their 
overwhelming approval of this program that provided much-needed education.  Although 
some comments indicated that it was a tough program, the overall assessment was that 
the education was well worth the effort.   
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4. Local Responders Participate in Education   
• Q28: Would having other responders (local, tribal, state, and federal; 
EMS; fire, law enforcement) as participants in this course bring value to 
the course?  In what way? 
One hundred percent of the respondents indicated that having other responders 
would be of benefit, and two of them made strong positive indications.  One respondent 
indicated that this would add value to the course and would provide an opportunity to 
meet the people that they would work with in a disaster.  The respondent stated, “Yes—
this would bring added value to the course.  It only makes sense because these are the 
people we will work with during a disaster.”  This respondent, who was a student from 
NGB, commented on the limited experience:  
YES! I was one of three NGB Soldiers in the course.  Everyone else was a 
Missouri Guardsman.  The breadth and depth of experiences/knowledge 
outside the MOARNG [Missouri Army National Guard] was limited. 
Having outside agencies included would have fostered the relationship 
needed between the agencies and expanded the knowledge base within the 
class.   
The last respondents indicated other participants would expand the discussion and 
experience, as one respondent stated:   
Yes.  It would allow a broader discussion.  We were limited because the 
majority of the class participants had limited experience and knowledge of 
homeland security and defense.  Persons in civilian employment would 
balance the military aspects.   
5. Use of Funds 
The issue on use of funds is still problematic, because even if the money is 
available, the NG must still have express authorization to use the money for the specific 
purpose for which the funds were designated.  If the use is not authorized for a particular 
purpose, the funds cannot be expended, as the use would become a violation of law.  In 
short, the user must have basic authority to commit the money, as it can only be utilized 
for the purpose for which it was given.   
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In short, there are three main conditions that must be met in order for the NG to 
spend federal money: 1) must have the money; 2) must have the authority to spend it; and 
3) must spend it for the right purpose.  Unless all three conditions are met, any expense of 
the money will cause violations.   
6. Readiness Impact on NG for the Federal War-Fighter Mission 
• Q29: What effect will this education program have on readiness for the 
federal war fight mission?   
The following were the responses to this question (Table 8): 
Table 8.   Effect on Readiness   
Positive Negative None 
70% 0% 30% 
All of the respondents were very positive with their responses; there were no 
negative responses. One respondent stated that the education will improve the NG 
response: “Will enhance it. The line between Federal and Civil Support missions is no 
longer clear. They need to complement each other.” Another respondent added the 
education will improve effectiveness in dealing with local and state missions as well as 
the overseas mission because “It enables military personnel to work with civilian 
government at the State and local level. This can translate into better relations when 
dealing with local governments overseas, such as community support in Iraq.” Another 
respondent, who had a slightly different view on the positive effect dealing with the 
overseas mission, pointed out that “The guard has always had the ability to be flexible 
and in many cases in the asymmetric fight in Iraq guard units have preformed better.  
This will only improve the guard and reserve forces ability to understand a more dynamic 
‘war fight.’”   
7. Different Education   
• Q30: What similarities exist in the National Guard capabilities and/or 
education for federal “go to war mission” and the homeland security or 
defense support for civil authorities or civil support missions?   
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Seventy percent of the respondents indicated similarities exist between the 
different missions, particularly in the areas of planning, coordinating, logistics, security 
and transportation.  One respondent brought up the point about the funding the NG 
receives, all of which is intended for the “go to war mission” and none for the DSCA 
mission.  One respondent stated that the capabilities overlap but the integration is 
different:  “Capabilities overlap tremendously.  Mechanisms for integrating those 
capabilities are distinctly different.”  Another respondent felt that the Military Decision 
Making Process (MDMP) and Incident Command System (ICS) are similar, explaining 
that the difference lies in the state laws controlling the employment of NG, “MDMP and 
ICS are similar and most guardsmen can understand the basic concepts.  It is the 
differences that exist within each state’s unique set of laws that govern our employment.”   
8. DoD Priority 
• Q31: What is the priority of effort between homeland security, defense 
support for civil authorities, civil support missions? Why?   
Below is the response:   
For DOD, Homeland Defense (HLD) remains a top priority.  However, 
OIF and OEF are taking center stage and often referred to as the “away 
games” for DOD HLD requirements.  There is broad recognition within 
the National Guard and at USNORTHCOM that the majority of our time 
and effort will be dedicated toward conducting DSCA.  Several strategic-
level documents (NSS, NDS, NMS, SPG, QDR, etc.) highlight DOD 
priorities and drive the inter-related systems used to develop, capture, and 
program/budget for DOD requirements and resources. 
The NG Advisor listed the priority for DoD as homeland defense. The NG 
Advisor also indicated that there will be more time spent on DSCA for the NG and 
USNORTHCOM.  This point will be addressed later in this thesis.   
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the survey data from the DOMS and recent graduates of 
the Naval Postgraduate NG Certificate Program and their views on NG education in the 
homeland security and civil support.  The interview data was also discussed.  Each part of 
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the data was categorized by the topics used later in this thesis.  In their response to the 
educational topics, respondents gave comments aiding in developing a prioritized list of 
topics, thoughts on who should attend, and the value of different degree programs.  While 
the need for education is evident, one main point noted was the lack of education on the 
state response process.  The next area discussed was reasons for the gap in education and 
what types of programs could be initiated that would most efficiently eliminate this gap.  
The inclusion of civilian first responders in these programs would contribute to a shared 
understanding of the civilian and military members’ roles and responsibilities in a 
response and aid in reducing the gap.  The next topic addressed the NPS NG Certificate 
Program and the value the students received from the completion of the course.  The last 
topic addressed the use of funds, impact on readiness, and the perceived DoD priority.  
These topics generated several areas of discussion, the primary points of which will be 
addressed in the next chapter.   
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IV. CLOSING THE GAP  
This chapter will first examine the challenges in closing the gap and then the 
benefits derived from the various ways to close the identified gap.  Several considerations 
included in the discussion of how to close the gap are current policies, available 
education, acceptance of new missions, and mission assignment.  This chapter will also 
look into the impact this education will have on readiness and time commitment for the 
NG.  The last part will explore several potential courses of action to close the gap in 
education.   
A. THE CHALLENGES IN CLOSING THIS GAP  
The process of researching this area revealed several challenges leading to the gap 
in education pertinent for the NG in preparing for its new missions.  Opportunities to 
consider in closing the existing gap include: the DoD acceptance of the civil support 
mission, funding, education priorities, lack of coordination between DHS and DoD, and 
the impact on readiness.  This section will discuss these considerations in closing the gap.   
1. Provide Education on the National Response Framework, NIMS, ICS, 
Homeland Security Process and the Civil Support Mission  
One of the challenges for the needed education of the NG is how the state process 
for disaster response is established.  The federal government has directed that all disaster 
response will be conducted in a consistent manner and that several concepts be developed 
and implemented.  Using the survey data to assist in determining area of importance, the 
DOMS were asked to rate topics as to their importance.  The results of their ratings show 
the following priorities, with 1 being the top priority:   
1. Critical infrastructure protection;  
2. Homeland security doctrine, policy, structure, purpose;  
3. Roles of federal, local, and state organizations in homeland security;  
4. Strategic planning for homeland security;  
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5. Terrorism;  
6. Homeland security issues, duty status, laws, regulation;  
7. National Incident Management System (NIMS).   
Interestingly, these topics tie in very closely with those covered in the Naval 
Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program. Continuing with the survey 
data, the respondents were asked questions about their views on these topics. The 
responses to the questions identified the following as areas in which the NG should be 
educated, as shown in the response from a respondent:   
Understand and become familiar with HSPD-5, HSPD-8, National 
Response Framework (NRF), National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS), Integrated Planning System 
(IPS), Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS), National Homeland 
Security Strategy, and National Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support.   
Responses to survey question when asked what changes should DoD make to 
educate the NG the respondent gave the following comments:   
All DOD members who may be involved in conducting DSCA missions or 
those who conduct interagency coordination should be required to 
complete FEMA courses on ICS, NRF, NIMS, and MACS.  Additionally, 
completion of the ARNORTH conducted DSCA course should be 
mandatory for all DOD personnel who may have a potential role in 
conducting DSCA operations.   
A common belief is that all DoD personnel should take the above listed courses to 
understand how the homeland security process works. The problem is, except for the 
USARNORTH DSCA course, there is no organized method to obtain this education 
except by independent study, and independent study only happens when an individual has 
an interest in this area. Most military personnel have so many other education courses to 
complete in both formal and distance learning settings that they have neither the time to 
seek this education nor the incentive to do so.   
The areas mentioned above are what drive the current state response process and 
the system used to manage a disaster. Because the NG provides the first military 
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responders, these military members must know the response process in order to be quick 
and effective in providing the capabilities needed by the locals in overcoming the 
disaster.   
2. Educate on the State Response Process  
The National Response Framework is the federal plan on how to respond to 
disasters in the nation.  This has changed how the states will respond to disasters.  The 
following statement from the report Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe Ready or 
Not stresses this point, “A National Response Framework describes how the federal 
government will work with state, local and tribal governments as well as the private 
sector and nongovernmental organizations during domestic incidents” (Wormuth and 
Witkowsky, 2008, p. vi).  The NG has not been trained on this process or any of the other 
changes by the federal or state governments.  This is one of the key reasons for the gap in 
education for the NG.   
To assist the NG in understanding homeland security at the state level, curriculum 
should be developed that will educate the NG leadership in the disaster response process 
and their role as responders to a disaster.  This will allow the NG leadership to conduct a 
mission analysis on its part to develop the training to accomplish the mission. To meet 
this objective, the education received by NG leadership should be taught consistently 
across the country and presented in a relevant manner as noted in the survey responders, 
(under the educational topic section, Chapter III) to the NG citizen-soldier’s constraints 
of time, family, and civilian career. This education can be achieved by developing 
educational courses to address this need and the topics addressed in the research.  During 
a review of the existing courses available in homeland security several possible options 
for presenting this education to the NG members were revealed.   
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3. DoD More Readily Accepts the Civil Support Mission, Assigns to the 
NG 
DoD continues to resist accepting the civil support mission and continues to focus 
on the homeland defense mission. The statement by Wormouth and Witkowsky supports 
this and suggests the need for change:   
…the next administration should make very clear that DoD will no longer 
hold the civil support mission at arm’s length and will be expected to play 
a very significant supporting role in the aftermath of a catastrophic event-a 
role that will require that DoD resource, train, and equip its forces 
accordingly. (2008, p. viii) 
Wormuth and Witkowsky (2008) point out the need for DoD to train its forces for 
the response process. Because the NG forces are the first to be committed to a disaster 
response, educating and training them in the appropriate response measures is a 
requirement The writers also went on to say, “…DoD will be expected to play a 
significant supporting role in catastrophe, working within the HSPD-5 framework” 
(Wormouth and Witkowsky 2008, p. viii). This concept ties in with the previous 
comments about training the NG on HSPD-5, NRF, NIMS; currently, the NG does not 
train on this.  A safe assumption is that the country will continue to experience disasters 
of all sizes and will need agencies to help respond to include the military, specifically the 
NG.   
Currently, DoD’s focus for education and training is on the homeland defense 
mission and fighting and winning the nation’s wars.  Closing the gap in education caused 
by the exclusive training on homeland defense will necessitate DoD to accept its role in 
homeland security or civil support missions, establish mission priorities, and apply funds 
to these missions.  This is pointed out in the Commission on the Guard and Reserves in 
“Recommendation Two:”  
Congress should codify the Department of Defense’s responsibility to 
provide support for civil authorities.  This statutory language should 
include the acknowledgment that responding to nature and man-made 
disasters in the homeland is a core competency of DOD, of equal 
importance to its combat responsibilities. Congress should also clearly 
state that DOD should be prepared to provide the bulk of the response to a 
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major catastrophe that incapacities civilian government over a substantial 
geographic area and that DOD should initiate the necessary planning, 
training, and coordination for such events. (2008, p. 14)  
DoD can task this requirement to the NGB to work this project and provide 
information to the SecDef. DHS must work with DoD in identifying the tasks DoD will 
be responsible for accomplishing when the military is deployed for a civil support 
mission directed specifically for the NG. The GAO, Gilmore Commission, and 
Commission on the Guard and Reserves have all addressed the need to shift support to 
the civil support missions to include the application of money and education.  Congress 
may have to continue to urge DoD to accept, plan for, supply resources, and prepare for 
the civil support missions.   
DoD can more readily accept this mission and give the priory of response to the 
NG with the active duty military serving as a backup as needed.  This is the reverse 
process DoD uses for the homeland defense mission; the active duty have the priority and 
the NG backs them up as needed.  An easy way that the NG could receive training would 
be for DoD to authorize the NG to train on the civil support mission during the one-
month training assembly per year.  This training would greatly support the NG capacity 
in providing and improving disaster response.  If DoD accepts the mission and would 
work to allow funds to be used for this mission, the education and training would work 
for both the state and federal mission, and the NG could train for the federal civil support 
mission and use the education during state responses.  This would help eliminate one of 
the gaps in the education for NG.   
4. National Guard Trains for the Homeland Defense Mission   
The NG priority is to train for the homeland defense mission; this is driven based 
on the purpose for which funds are received and guidance is received from DoD.  This 
could change if DoD were to accept the civil support mission.   
In 2004, when the Rand Arroyo Center researchers explored how the Army could 
react to homeland security missions, they came up with five possibilities, the first of 
which addressed the argument within this thesis.  The researchers stated:  
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Possibility 1: The National Guard is inadequately prepared because of its 
focus on conventional warfare. 
Army response 1: Improve National Guard homeland security capabilities 
by providing funds and facilitating the sharing of state assets. DoD 
funding would be provided for training that enhances a state’s homeland 
security capability. Legislative changes would facilitate use of one state’s 
soldiers in another state by making laws uniform and extending legal 
protections to guardsmen performing homeland security.  (Rand, 2004, p. 
1) 
The above excerpt points to the idea of using federal funds to help the NG train 
for the state mission, which could also be used as the federal mission for civil support.   
5. Appropriate Use of Funds  
The Rand excerpt above addresses several points regarding funding that is of 
significance for this section.  This section addresses the possibility of directing funds to 
support the state missions, develop training/education for state homeland security, and 
change existing laws governing the use of NG personnel across state lines.  Per the 
interview with the USPFO in Chapter III, the three main conditions for the use of federal 
funds are that the federal government would have to give the money to the state NG, give 
the state authorization to use or spend the federal money for state use for the NG to do 
state-level training, and allow the NG to utilize the money for the intended purpose.   
The appropriate use of funds may be the most complicated change that must 
happen in order for these educational programs to succeed.  The laws and policies on the 
use of funds will have to be changed or modified by Congress to allow the NG to use 
federal funds in order to train for civil support missions that the NG would perform in 
either a State Active Duty status or a Title 32 status.  In order for this to occur, Congress 
would have to approve the use of funds for this purpose when it decides on the 
appropriation of funds.   
The other option is that if DoD accepts the homeland security or civil support 
missions and assigns them to the NG, then the NG could train for the federal mission that 
could also be used to support the local and state authorities.  If each unit in the NG could 
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be authorized to spend up to 16 hours (one weekend drill) performing education and 
training for potential civil support mission, this preparation would be an initial step in 
preparing the NG to conduct such missions and close this gap.  Presently, for NG units 
assigned a civil disturbance mission, one weekend a year is allotted for them to train for 
that assigned mission.  These units are trained to conduct the mission in all three duty 
statuses and will be activated before Title 10 troops are sent to the mission site.  Just as 
each state is allowed to conduct civil disturbance training, each state should be allowed to 
assign civil support missions to its NG units based on the assessment of need.   
6. Lack of Collaboration Between DHS and DoD on Common Missions 
DHS has not yet collaborated with DoD on the civil support missions that they 
will expect DoD to support.  Without this collaboration, it is difficult for DoD to perform 
the mission analysis needed in order to develop the education and training standards and 
then disseminate those to the NG to accomplish.  The following statement supports this 
point:  “According to DoD, NORTHCOM cannot conduct comprehensive planning for 
civil support until DHS establishes civil support requirements” (Gilmore Commission 
2002, pp. K-12-13).  Several commission reports previously mentioned have addressed 
the need for this collaboration, but DHS has not completed this task.  The Commission on 
the National Guard and Reserves noted in its report that DHS has yet to provide DoD 
with the requirements needed for mission analysis by DoD; “DHS has not demonstrated a 
commitment to assuming its responsibility as the lead agency for identifying the 
requirement that the DoD must meet to adequately perform domestic civil support 
missions” (2008, p. 13).  To close this gap, Congress may have to pass legislation to force 
compliance or tie collaboration to funding in order to achieve completion of this task.  
These points were noted in the Commission on the Guard and Reserves in 
“Recommendation Five,” as listed in the Executive Summary:   
In accordance with S1815 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization 
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, with the assistance of the 
Secretary of Defense, should generate civil support requirements, which 
the Department of Defense will be responsible for validation as 
appropriate.  DOD should include civil support requirement in its 
programming and budgeting.  As part of their effort, DOD should 
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determine existing capabilities from all components that could fulfill civil 
support requirements and rebalance them where appropriate (consistent 
with their other obligations), shifting capabilities determined to be 
required for state-controlled reposed to domestic emergencies to the 
National Guard, and shifting capabilities currently resident in the National 
Guard that are nor required fore its state missions but are required for its 
federal missions either to the federal reserves components or to the active 
duty military, as appropriate. (2008, p. 15) 
The commission recommended changes in funds and for the DoD to accept the 
mission of civil support.  There have been several commissions that have noticed the 
same basic points that are gaps in the education and mission that must be corrected.   
7. Readiness Impact on NG for the Federal War-Fighter Mission 
Readiness is extremely important to a military unit; anything that distracts from 
readiness is legitimately eliminated. Commands and/or careers are decided on the ability 
of units to be ready to complete the mission. While it can be argued that education in 
homeland security necessarily detracts from the war-fighter mission, this training should 
have minimal effect on unit readiness.  It will be important for new personnel to obtain 
this education to help them understand their positions and to perform the duties more 
efficiently. The education could potentially enhance readiness by providing better-
educated military personnel who are able to see the bigger picture, understand the 
mission better, and can adapt more quickly to a changing environment. This education 
will produce better leaders for the NG and create more capable units by increasing their 
readiness in the homeland security arena.  In response to the DOMS survey, question 29, 
asking about potential effects education would have on readiness, 70 percent of 
respondents said it would have a positive impact, while 30 percent said there is no impact 
on the federal war-fighting. 
B. THE EDUCATIONAL OPTIONS   
This research has focused on the educational requirements for the NG in the area 
of response process and the new mission for homeland security, civil support, and DSCA.  
During the interview with NORTHCOM’s NG advisor, he suggested the following 
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educational topics: “Defense Support of Civil Authorities is DODs responsibility under 
the National Response Framework IAW HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 (including the recent 
annex 1)” (McClellan, April, 2008). This research has uncovered a gap in the education 
of the NG in these new mission areas.  Further review has identified some areas that have 
contributed to the gap.   
1. Need for Education  
A review of the courses offered in homeland security, civil support, or DSCA 
revealed there are few opportunities for the NG leadership to obtain education in these 
areas. Given the recognized lack of education for NG leadership in civil support, it is 
clear that the leadership would benefit through an increased understanding of its role in 
the response process and the missions under the umbrella of civil support.  To achieve 
this, a standardized education for the NG that is presented in a consistent and user-
friendly manner must be developed. Unfortunately, the educational opportunities 
available to the NG are few in number due to limited courses, student quotas, and the 
required time for the courses. Often the amount of time needed for the NG members to 
attend the education programs that are currently available is prohibitive, given the fact 
that many of the NG members needing to take the courses are employed full-time in the 
civilian sector. Time for education is always at a premium and challenging to find; on the 
other hand, the cost for not educating personnel is very high. The importance of this 
education means that time must be found.  In short, the few courses available do not have 
enough relevance or depth of material to educate a sufficient number of NG leaders 
across the nation to the degree needed before responding to a disaster.   
2. Education on State Process  
For the NG leadership to understand its role in homeland security or civil support 
missions, there are some topics on which they should be educated, all of which were 
reviewed earlier in Chapters II and III as part of the survey data.  A significant point 
taken from this data is that the NG should have a course that covers the state process of 
disaster response.  Responses to question one asking for suggested education topics that 
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the NG should emphasize for the leadership indicated the topic of the state level response 
was a high priority.  One respondent to the question eight (dealing with what educational 
topics the NG leadership should emphasize to accomplish the homeland security mission) 
replied, “Recognize the importance of developing sound working relationships with 
mission partners before an event. Learn and understand cultural differences that can 
prevent successful collaboration, communication, and coordination with mission 
partners.”  The NG mission partners will be the state personnel; it is important the NG 
understand state priorities and have a good working relationship with state personnel in 
order to be successful. One response to question 13, which probed the perceived 
willingness of NG members within the various states to work on a bachelor’s degree, 
was:   
The biggest shortfall in education is learning how to conduct successful 
interagency operations for domestic incidents with intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations.  This is a huge challenge for most 
military members because they do not understand how their civilian 
counterparts train and organize for preparedness (pre-event) and response 
(post-event) activities in the homeland.   
This indicates the importance in educating on how the state process works to 
reduce confusion during the response.  Also noted above is the point that the NG must 
work with first responders and emergency management personnel.  The respondent went 
on to say there is a difference in culture, doctrine, and terminology between the military 
and other agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, which must be understood 
and addressed before the response to a disaster can be successful.  In reference to 
question 2, proposing changes or additions to DoD offerings of NG education in order to 
meet the homeland security role, indicated a need for education on the state response 
process. A review of current courses offered shows that state disaster response is an area 
not covered in the current courses in the DoD inventory. This need could be filled by a 
40-hour course.   
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3. Education Delivery Options and Methods 
The first option is to develop a course similar to USARNORTH Defense Support 
of Civil Authorities (DSCA) course, but with the objective to cover the state response 
process and related issues.  This option will be referred to as the short course.  A potential 
topic outline for this course is listed in Appendix I.   
The second option is an advanced degree option which is intended to develop an 
understanding of homeland security, the NG’s role and its expectations as well as those 
of civilian authorities.  If the advanced degree option is to have any value beyond the 
short course, any course work done should be accredited for or credited toward an 
advanced degree program.  The ideal course would be the combination of a program 
similar to the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program, adding the 
above short course at the graduate level and developing more courses that would allow 
the students to earn a master’s degree in homeland security.  Responses to the DOMS 
survey, question 10, dealing with the levels at which this education program should be 
directed to be most effective for the NG, included the following thought:   
I believe it is a mix of all four [degree options].  I have not found people 
interested in HLS when openly approached.  However, when they are 
exposed, then they become more interested.  So I believe that a program 
structured with certification on through graduate level would be the most 
successful.   
Other responses tended toward supporting a certificate program as being the best 
option due to the fact that “staff positions for our Domestic Operations branch rotate 
frequently”.  Ideally, allowing first responders and emergency management personnel to 
participate in both options along with the military would increase the learning as well as 
networking opportunities.  This interaction would allow for the establishment of trust 
before the disaster, a common understanding of each others’ roles, and the appropriate 
response processes.  All the survey respondents from the NG Certificate Program agreed 
that having other responders at the course would benefit the participants, as brought out 
by their responses to question 28, if having other responders as participants in the course 
would bring value to the course.  Their answers were: “Yes—this would bring added 
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value to the course.  It only makes sense because these are the people we will work with 
during a disaster”.  As a result of these responses, these two options will be explored 
more in depth later in this chapter.   
A justification for the advanced degree option is that the military now requires all 
officers to have a bachelor’s degree before receiving a commission.  As a result, the 
advanced degree options will be of interest to the officer core.  By the time the enlisted 
reach the leadership level of E-5 to E-7, most have completed a bachelor’s degree also.  
Responses to question 10, dealing with the education levels that would be most effective 
for the NG, showed these results:  30 percent of the respondents indicated a certificate 
was sufficient, 25 percent chose a graduate degree, and 15 percent said a combination of 
all four options was preferred.  An advantage of the advanced degree option is that the 
degree program can be completed in a few years by going part-time to obtain the needed 
hours versus a bachelor’s degree which requires four years going full time. The 
bachelor’s degree option is not conducive for the NG leadership.  Respondents of the 
survey point out their preferences very clearly. Question 12, which probed the 
willingness of respondents to work on a bachelor’s degree in homeland security, revealed 
that 75 percent of the respondents selected a bachelor’s degree as being of “low 
importance to the NG”.  In regard to the advanced degree option, it has many inherent 
problems to overcome, e.g., finding colleges that would support this option, time required 
to work the issues, and finding qualified instructors. In general, respondents also 
displayed low interest towards an advanced degree program, as revealed by their answers 
to the survey data questions 14, their willingness to work on a master’s degree in 
homeland security, and 15, the willingness of NG members to work on a master’s degree 
in homeland security. Reponses were almost equally split between an advanced degree 
being or not being a priority. Consequently, based on the research data derived from the 
responses, the continued pursuit of the advanced degree option is not recommended, 
leaving the short course options as the more viable ones.   
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C. COURSE OF ACTION PROCESS  
1. Process   
To compare the different options, this thesis will use the Army course of action 
comparison process used in the military decision making process.  The course of action 
comparison consists of several steps which will be outlined below and developed in the 
next sections. The first step is to develop the comparison criteria which are the 
dominating or governing factors that will help determine the suitability and feasibility of 
the courses of action.  In the development process, some comparisons are used to cover 
broad areas and may not be very sound in detail but is still an option; hence, the reason 
for the process to determine the suitability and feasibility. The second step is the 
comparison method or process and display of the comparison. The last step is the 
recommendation based on the comparison.   
The comparison criteria are the major important points that will determine the 
suitability and feasibility of one course of action over another. This weighting factor is 
normally designated at the start of the development of courses of action based on factors 
that the higher organization determines to be significant. The criteria used for the 
comparison will be:  
• Time to implement program is defined as the amount of time required to 
develop and implement the program nationwide, or to make the 
educational programs functional or operational. 
• Time commitment by students refers the amount of time taken away from 
the family and employer in order to complete the educational program as 
well as the student time required to complete the program. 
• Throughput of students is the estimated number of students who can be 
educated on the material in the least amount of time.   
• Depth or quality of education is determined by the applicability and 
usefulness of the educational material and the depth to which the students 
are exposed to in the education program.   
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• Impact on readiness is the effect the education will have on the units, NG, 
state and their capability to integrate quickly when needed for a disaster or 
for the current war effort. 
• Expense to establish program refers to the start-up costs of the program as 
well as the sustainment costs. 
• Educational value to NG is defined as the degree of value that the 
knowledge gained will have for the response and civil support missions of 
the NG.   
The comparison method or process is the application of the criteria to the course 
of action and applying a number of one, two, or three; a lower number is a better rating, a 
higher number is a less desirable rating; and each is based on the analysis.  Justification 
will be used to allow the reader to understand the points and agree or disagree with the 
assigned points.  Given that this is a subjective part of the process, the more people 
involved in completing the comparison will improve the outcome.  The last step is to 
make a recommendation based on the display method which presents a decision matrix 
for each of the courses of action compared.  Justifications will be given as to why one 
was selected over the others. The last part of the chapter is the comparison of the 
different COA options’ using the same process.   
2. Short Courses COA and Comparison 
There are several possible courses of action (COA) for closing the gap, all of 
which provide standardized education to the NG leadership.  The option explored is the 
short educational course that would consist of a distance-learning phase followed by a 
one-week in residence phase.  Both phases would focus on the local and state response 
process for the NG leadership.  This section will explore each possible COA based on the 
short course and provide a comparative analysis of each.  There are four developed COAs 
that will be addressed below.   
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a. COA 1: USARNORTH Develops or Incorporates This Course 
,nto Its DSCA Course 
The first COA, the short course, would be a stand-alone course based on 
the same concepts as the USARNORTH DSCA course.  An alternate option is to 
incorporate the short course with the USARNORTH DSCA course, as the USARNORTH 
DSCA course is a close fit for meeting the needs of the proposed NG short course.  This 
inclusion would cause problems for the DSCA students as it would extend the second 
phase by another week.  This additional time and the relevance of the material for some 
participants may negatively impact current attendees who cannot stay the added days.  
Under this COA, USARNORTH would manage the course with the net result that NGB 
would have limited control of this course’s content.   
The advantages for this COA include the already existing set-up for phase 
I of the distance-learning program, as well as the update system in phase III, both of 
which would be very beneficial to this course.  Question 2 of the DOMS survey intended 
to identify changes or additions DoD should make to educate the NG for the homeland 
security role, brought a range of responses indicating that NIMS rated as a priority for 
necessary education for the NG.  The NIMS requirement for the USARNORTH DSCA 
course would meet this need, as the interview with the NORTHCOM advisor indicated 
NIMS being equally as important.  He stated, “Understand and become familiar with 
HSPD-5, HSPD-8, National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident Management 
System (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS)…” The USARNORTH DSCA course 
could be required as a prerequisite to cover these phases of information. This COA would 
provide another opportunity for NORTHCOM via USARNORTH to coordinate with 
NGB for the course development and instruction.  Opening up the state-level course to all 
first responders and emergency management personnel would expand the field of 
participants, provide greater value to the homeland security community through 
consistent education across all levels, and offer a means for all participants to become 
knowledgeable on common concerns.  All responses to the survey question 28, which 
queried if having other responders as participants in the course would bring value to it, 
showed this as a very beneficial option.  Ultimately, this would benefit the nation by 
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bringing all types and levels of responders together instead of only the military and DoD 
civilians, as is now the case with the USARNORTH DSCA.   
A disadvantage for this COA is that NGB would have diminished ability 
to make any modifications to the course.  The states also would not be able to modify the 
course to cover their specific laws and process.  Another disadvantage of this course is 
that it would not be available to first responders or emergency management personnel at 
local and state levels.  An alternative would be that if USARNORTH developed a 
separate course and deliver it in the states, the states could be given a block of time for 
the state specific laws and allow first responders or emergence management personnel to 
attend.  Unfortunately, there is little or no motivation for USARNORTH to implement 
this COA.   
b. COA 2: NGB Develops and Teaches Program 
The second COA would be for the NGB to develop an educational course 
and teach it in the states.  NGB should teach this course as it would apply directly to the 
NG civil support mission.  The course should address issues that pertain to the missions 
required at the state level and the state process utilized in facilitating response as this is 
part of the identified gap in education.  NGB should take the lead, as the Active Duty 
(DoD) does not understand or have experience with the state-level response.  Responses 
to DOMS survey question concerning who should teach (DoD or colleges) this course 
more effectively, 42 percent indicated DoD, 28 percent indicated both, and 15 percent 
indicated public or private colleges or universities.  Responses supported the following 
argument for NGB being the proponent of the education:  “If done by DoD, NGB should 
be the proponent, as the active component does not understand how the majority of 
situations, which are those not elevated above state level, are handled.”   
Taking the course on the road to the states’ NG headquarters would also 
allow local and state first responders and emergency management personnel to attend this 
course, which would help them to understand the process of coordinating their work with 
the NG personnel and to become familiar with the military ways of operating.  This 
course, if offered around the country, would help to reduce travel costs and time away 
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from home for the participants.  This course should be developed and taught with a block 
of instruction that would be modified to fit each state’s unique situation and laws.  NGB 
should establish this program with a specific distance-learning course to prepare the 
students for a face-to-face session.  The USARNORTH DSCA course could be required 
as a prerequisite for admission into this course to cover the Phase I and III material.  The 
requirement to complete the National Incident Management System courses (ICS 100, 
200,700, and 800) should also be included for the distance-learning phase I.  NGB could 
contract this course out for the development and instruction with its oversight.   
Advantages for this COA are increased access for NG leadership to the 
education, reduction in cost, and provide a consistent presentation across the country.  An 
appealing advantage for NG personnel is the reduction in the time that NG leaders would 
be away from work and families, yet it would still allow them the opportunity to receive 
the necessary education to understand the NG’s state role in civil support missions.  If 
this course is conducted at the state level, then this would allow the development of close 
working relationships with the other responders.  NGB would assume the costs related to 
development and implementation of the course.  Disadvantages of this COA are the time 
and money required to set up this option.   
c. COA 3: States Develop and Teach Program 
The third COA would be for each state to develop and instruct an 
educational course with guidance from NGB on required topics, thus allowing the states 
to have specific focus on their particular state laws and processes.  The advantage of this 
COA is that each state could specifically tailor its program to meet its unique needs and 
practices.  By controlling who attends this course, the state would have the capability to 
allow local and state first responders and emergency management personnel to 
participate.  This should be coordinated between the NG J7 training, the DOMS, and the 
state emergency management agency.  The disadvantages of this COA are, first, that the 
states would have to develop their own detailed program, which would demand time and 
resources that they do not have; and, secondly, there would be little consistency in the  
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training across the nation, as each state would probably conduct this course differently.  
Finally, each state would have to develop a method to update past students on any 
changes to the process or procedures used.   
d. COA 4: Do Nothing 
The fourth COA is to do nothing and not make changes in the present 
status quo.  This would require the NG leadership to learn by experience or by seeking 
out the courses on its own and piecing the needed information together to accomplish the 
mission.  No advantages were revealed during this analysis.  The disadvantage for this 
COA is it does not close the gap in the demonstrated need for this education.   
3. Short Course Comparison Decision Matrix and Justification 
The comparison criteria and justification for the various COAs for the short 
course are explained in the following section, a lower score is better (see Table 9).   
a. Time to Implement Program  
Table 9.   Short Course Decision Matrix 
Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 
Time to implement program 1 2 3 3 
Time commitment by students 1 1 1 3 
Throughput of students 2 1 2 3 
Depth or quality of material 2 1 2 3 
Impact on readiness 1 1 1 3 
Expense to establish program 1 2 3 3 
Educational value to NG 2 1 1 3 
Total 10 9 13 21 
• COA 1 program was rated as 1 because little time would be 
required to add this course to the already existing instructional 
materials.   
• COA 2 program was rated as 2.  Although National Guard Bureau 
would require more time to develop this course, it could still use 
the USARNORTH course as a prerequisite for enrolling in this 
course, as well as a tracking system to verify completion of 
prerequisite course.   
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• COA 3 program was rated as 3 because more time and personnel 
would be required for the states to develop the program and so the 
disadvantages heavily outweigh any of its advantages.   
• COA 4 was rated as 3; doing nothing does not close the education 
gap, this still entails a cost; that the cost is in time lost and 
expended human capital trying to cope with the status quo.   
b. Time Commitment by Students   
• COAs 1-3 were all rated as 1, and there was not a significant 
variation in time commitments; there was not any advantage for 
any specific COA.  
• COA 4 was rated as 3 because learning the material by sorting 
through multiple courses consumes time.   
c. Throughput of Students 
• COA 1 was rated as 2 because the addition of a second week to the 
program taught by USARNORTH, which would potentially reduce 
the number of students attending this program.   
• COA 2 was rated as 1 because this course if National Guard 
Bureau should be able to set up this one week course quickly. By 
taking this course to the state will increasing the number of 
students who can attend and complete this course.   
• COA 3 was rated as 2 because 54 states and territories would be 
required to set up this course, which could potentially create 
variations of the materials and focus of the course instruction. 
• COA 4 was given a 3 because having to seek out the information 
would require a time commitment that most NG personnel would 
not pursue in order to find the information, the courses or have the 
time and/or financial ability to attend.   
d. Depth or Quality of Education 
• COA 1 was rated as 2 because USARNORTH would have 
problems finding the information to develop the course so that it 
would include the instruction for the NG at the state and local 
levels. However, since USARNORTH has demonstrated quality of 
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instruction in the development and delivery of its own course, it 
should be able to continue the same quality for a NG course.   
• COA 2 was rated as 1 because the National Guard Bureau should 
have the best information and the best experience to draw upon in 
the process during the developing the course content.  The 
National Guard Bureau has access to more resources for 
developing courses than the states and should be able to provide 
quality course development.   
• COA 3 was rated as 2 because the states would undoubtedly all 
vary the course’s construction and content.  Finally, tempo of 
development and implementation would be determined by the 
states’ limitations of resources and staff.  
• COA 4 was rated as 3 because of the need for the NG students to 
find the required education pieces by sorting though many courses.  
The number and variety of courses available would no doubt vary 
in quality of education, and thus diminishing their overall value to 
the NG which requires consistency in subject matter across the 
nation.   
e. Impact on Readiness  
• COAs 1-3 were rated as 1 because there should not be differences 
in the effect of the NG’s readiness.   
• COA 4 was rated as 3 since this option would require increased 
travel for the student in order for them to take courses to gain the 
required education.   
f. Expense to Establish Program 
• COA 1 was rated as 1 because the addition to an already existing 
course should have minimal effect for the program’s development.   
• COA 2 was rated as 2 since the National Guard Bureau would have 
to develop a program, which involves new expenses.  Although 
NGB may opt to hire a contractor to develop the course, expenses 
for the development would still have to be met.   
• COA 3 was rated as 3 due to the fact that the states’ development 
of the course would involve the great expense. Having the states 
develop this would multiply the NG development expense by 54 
times (the number of states and territories).   
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• COA 4 was rated as 3 because the DoD to have students search for 
the necessary courses and to travel to those sites, which would 
increase the expenses for travel.   
g. Educational Value to the NG  
• COA 1 was rated as 2 because USARNORTH may potentially 
have difficulty understanding the implications and differences of 
the response means at local, state, and federal levels.  Since 
USARNORTH personnel do not work at the state level, they do 
not have a strong incentive to develop this course addition.   
• COA 2 was rated as 1 because the National Guard Bureau should 
better understand the need for this education, and they should also 
accordingly produce the valuable education that the NG leadership 
requires.   
• COA 3 was rated as 1 since each state’s knowledge of its own 
response process and its understanding of the differences between 
the different response modes of operations would aid in the 
development of a valuable course.  As each state recognizes the 
need for the education to fill the gap, each would be motivated to 
develop its own course.   
• COA 4 was rated as 3 because this option would have little value 
to the NG due to the amount of work and time required to obtain 
the education.   
The total for COA 1 is 10, COA 2 is 9, COA 3 is 13, and COA 4 is 21.  
Following the process established earlier, the preferred COA is COA 2, which is National 
Guard Bureau establish this one-week course.  The categories of throughput of students 
and depth or quality of education were the two determining factors in this COA.   
4. Another COA: Implement the Naval Postgraduate School National 
Guard Certificate Program 
This is another course of action that does not fit into the short course options but 
is worth taking a look at as an alternate COA to close the gap in NG education.  The 
Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program, offered to the NG 
leadership in two trial states but then discontinued, provided valuable training and 
arguably should be returned to educational offerings for the NG.  In the survey of the 
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Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate participants, all respondents 
answered “Yes” to questions 21 and 22 asking if this program would be recommended 
not only to their states, but to all states.  In regard to question 24, if the course aided in 
understanding the Guard’s role in homeland security, 100 percent of the respondents 
agreed that the course was beneficial in gaining understanding the NG role in homeland 
security.  Eighty percent of respondents indicated this course help them to understand the 
NG role in DSCA.  One recommendation is that the National Guard Certificate program 
could be modified with the addition of the short course option at the graduate level to 
produce a program specifically for the NG and all military personnel in general.  This 
program could also be offered to first responders and emergency management personnel 
as well.   
Because the course has already been developed, NGB would only have to find 
instructors to teach this program.  This course could be taken on the road to states for a 
reduction in travel and other costs.  NGB or state NG could work to have colleges and 
universities in the state grant graduate credit for this program.  This COA would also 
allow the colleges and universities to analyze the demand or need for a homeland security 
master’s degree program in their regions.   
If the Naval Postgraduate School would not certify the instructors to teach this 
program and grant graduate college credit, then NGB would be required to seek college 
credits from another institution.  This program would not be of value without offering 
graduate college credit.  Because the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard 
Certificate program has already been developed, the advantages for this COA are the 
quick start-up time with fewer expenses.  This would require less time away from work 
and families on the part of students, and it would increase student flexibility by allowing 
more time to complete a master’s program at a local college or university.  Although this 
program already focuses on what the NG leadership should know to accomplish the civil 
support mission, some minor adjustments in the curriculum might be needed.  The 
disadvantages for this COA are that this course would not offer a master’s degree for the 
NG leadership, and depending on who certifies the course for graduate college credit, the 
credit may or may not transfer, which would negate the advantage of this program.   
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The comparison criteria and justification for the Naval Postgraduate School NG 
Certificate (NPS NGC) program are explained in the following section (see Table 10).   
Table 10.   NPS NGC Decision Matrix 
Criteria NPS NGC 
Time to implement program 2 
Time commitment by students 2 
Through put of students 1 
Depth or quality of education 1 
Impact on readiness 1 
Expense to establish program 1 
Educational value to NG 2 
Total 10 
a. Time to Implement Program  
NPS NGC was rated as 2 as this COA incorporates a developed program 
of instruction proven to be successful.  Initiating this program would be an easier option.   
b. Time Commitment by Students  
NPS NGC was rated as 2 because this option would require some amount 
of time for completion, and it is specific to the needs of the NG.   
c. Throughput of Students 
NPS NGC was rated as 1 because this course has already been developed 
and could be initiated quickly into the colleges and universities who would be willing to 
accept it.   
d. Depth or Quality of Education 
NPS NGC program was rated as 1, since this program has already been 
tested, and the surveys conducted indicated it was very valuable to the NG.   
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e. Impact on Readiness  
NPS NGC was rated as 1 because the shorter course would be more 
focused on needs of the NG, and if the colleges and universities in the home states would 
offer this course then the long period of time students are away from their units would be 
eliminated.   
f. Expense to Establish Program  
NPS NGC was rated as 1 because the course is already established, which 
reduces the initiation expenses for colleges and universities.  This option would allow 
colleges and universities to explore the need and requirements to offer a master’s degree 
program in homeland security with minimal expense.   
g. Educational Value to the NG Program  
NPS NGC was rated as 2, while it does not produce a master’s degree, this 
option would start students on the process to obtain one if they desired to.   
The total for NPS NGC, was a 10, this COA is close to tying with the 
short course options of NGB develop a course.   
D. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has reviewed possibilities and COAs on how to close some of the 
gaps in NG education.  It also reviewed the need for this education on the state response 
process and ways to deliver this education.  The challenges to closing the gaps derived 
from funding issues and DoD’s reluctance to accept the civil support mission were 
explored.  The last section listed some of the more likely COAs with their advantages and 
disadvantages, all of which will be analyzed with the end result of one COA being 
selected as the preferred option.  The next chapter will address the recommendations on 
how to close the gaps.   
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V. SUMMARY 
This chapter will summarize the research questions directed to identifying reasons 
why the gap in education for NG leadership in the area of homeland security, civil 
support, and DSCA exists and what steps can be taken to close it.  The argument 
presented in this thesis is, if the gap in education is closed, then the NG will provide a 
faster and more efficient response based on improved knowledge, skills, and integration 
with civilian authorities in future disasters.  Because of these improvements, the NG will 
better serve the state and nation.   
This thesis explored reasons why the gap in the education; this knowledge gap 
became particularly obvious during recent major natural disasters beginning with the 
Hurricane Katrina response.  While there has always been an issue with this lack of 
education, the disasters requiring responses were smaller and made less headline news 
than did those that have occurred recently.  As disasters become bigger, more costly, and 
require more personnel on both the civilian and military sides to manage, the NG 
leadership must be knowledgeable of the roles NG personnel are expected to fill if the 
process of providing military support for civilian authorities is to function smoothly.   
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
Research questions initially presented at the beginning of this thesis were:   
• To overcome the gap in disaster response knowledge, what are the topics 
on which the DoD should specifically educate the NG leadership?   
• What has caused this education gap and, by knowing the cause, how can 
the NG leadership overcome it?   
The first research question focused on what education topics the NG requires to 
better understand their role in response. Chapter II delved into the many programs, 
courses, and materials that are currently being provided for education available to the 
NG.  One area that was brought to light was the missing education on how the state 
response process works and how the NG will fit into that process.  The second part of this 
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question referred to what changes DoD should make in order for this education to meet 
the needs for the NG.  In order to discuss what changes may be needed in order to make 
recommendations; the thesis explored the courses that are currently being taught about 
homeland security, civil support, or DSCA and their advantages and disadvantages.   
The second research question focused on the causes of the education gap and 
possible solutions in overcoming it.  This research revealed that there were gaps in the 
education.  In reviewing the causes, it became evident that homeland security is an 
emerging concept with new missions that neither DoD and nor the NG have addressed 
adequately in order to perform them effectively.  The development of federal response 
plans, DoD’s reluctance to accept civil support missions, and the failure of DHS to 
coordinate with DoD on expected missions have all contributed to the gap in disaster 
response education.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS   
1. A Short Course Should be Conducted :ithin the States in Order to 
Promote Maximum Education of NG Personnel   
Obviously, the gap can be closed by providing education to the NG leadership, 
but the challenge is to determine the topics to be included and who will provide this 
education.  The recommendation for reducing or eliminating the gap in the NG education 
is the development of a short course as explained in Chapter IV.  This one-week course 
focuses on the state process for the deployment of responders to a disaster.  This program 
could be run similarly to the USARNORTH DSCA course.  This course should require a 
distance learning phase before attending the resident phase.  The completion the NIMS 
courses should also be included in the distance learning phase.   
This course should be developed and taught under the control of the NGB, with a 
block of instruction for each state to cover its unique situation, procedures, and specific 
legal parameters.  The course should be taken on the road to the states for instruction and 
allow first responders and emergency management personnel to attend; this would help to 
establish trust and understanding between agencies regarding each other’s roles in a 
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disaster.  Such an all-encompassing state response course would benefit both the federal 
and state level governments, but it would be most appealing to NG members.   
The advantages of this COA are the quickness that the NG leadership can receive 
the needed education and the capability to meet the needs of high student volume across 
the nation.  The disadvantage for this COA is that it does not provide an intensive course 
of study; it only meets minimum education requirements.  Nevertheless, this course will 
enable the NG leadership to offer an increased capability for more rapid and efficient 
response to emergencies.  Appendix I is a list of potential topics for this education.   
An alternate educational process to help close this gap would be for the NGB to 
reestablish the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program. This 
certificate program could be taught in the states and should include not only NG 
leadership, but also first responders and emergency management personnel. Including all 
responder groups would help to establish mutual trust and understanding of each other’s 
respective roles in a disaster.  The only shortfall in this program is that the state process 
for disaster response is not covered, although this could very easily be remedied with the 
addition of the short course.   
2. DoD 6hould Accept the Civil Support Mission and Assign It to the NG   
In DoD’s view of homeland security, its main mission is homeland defense, and 
its secondary mission is civil support. As addressed in Chapter IV, DoD should more 
readily acknowledge the civil support mission and assign it to the NG. This 
recommendation will eliminate many of the gaps because of the increased federal funding 
and training resources made available to the NG.  Because the civil support mission will 
continue to change to meet the challenges of homeland security, continual modification 
of the education must necessarily occur. If the NG leadership is to continue to have a 
vital role in homeland security, its leaders will require new education to prepare them to 
meet those changes in the civil support missions.   
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3. Change Laws to Allow the NG to Use Federal Funds in Support of 
Civil Support Missions 
Policy and statutory changes may have to be made to allow federal funds to be 
used for the civil support mission.  Funding should be authorized for use by the NG for 
the civil support missions.  A GAO report touched on the issue of funds use.   
…federal funds have not typically been provided to DOD specifically for 
the National Guard’s civil support missions unless directed by statute.  
Instead, DOD planning has generally assumed that if the National Guard is 
prepared for its warfighting role it is prepared to respond to a disaster or 
emergency at home. (GAO-08-311, 2008, p 18) 
If funds are authorized for the NG to use for their civil support missions, then the 
gap may be considerably narrowed which, in turn, would result in a better educated NG 
that is more capable of protecting the country.   
To accomplish this, Congress would have to amend the language in the Defense 
Appropriation Act or designate funds specifically for homeland security or civil support 
mission for the NG. Guttieri reinforces this point, “Unless Congress forces the DoD to 
focus on the home front with targeted financial legislation, it seems unlikely that the 
military will shift its priorities” (2003, p. 2).  The other option would be for Department 
of Homeland Security to provide funds to DoD for the homeland security or civil support 
mission for the NG.   
Federal funding is important in this specific aspect. All NG units have the 
potential to serve as responders for a disaster response or for a civil support mission in 
their state or in support of other states.  It is important that these units be granted one 
weekend a year to train on missions that their state determines to be important or has a 
high potential for activation and response to disaster in their state and region.  The staff at 
the state level could identify missions and tasks the units could be expected to perform 
and train on to prepare for a response.  This should also allow NG unit leadership to 
participate in local or state emergency management exercises.  As these exercises are at 
the state level, states cannot use federal funds or federal training time for NG leadership 
to participate in these exercises.  Lieutenant General Blum, former Chief of the NGB, 
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stated, “The National Guard has a close, on-going, and continuous relationship with the 
first responders at state and local levels that is essential to provide the response that the 
American public expects and deserves” (2007, p 13).  The lack of participation with the 
civilian first responders could potentially inhibit the desired development of knowledge 
and trust between the local emergency mangers and the NG before a disaster response is 
necessary.   
Federal funds should be allowed for use to support the training for the assigned 
civil support missions. The normal cost for this one-weekend training and any special 
costs for the training should be allowed in order to support the mission.  In the majority 
of cases, the costs would fall under normal weekend training costs.  In short, federal 
funding that is normally authorized for allowable training costs as cost of doing business 
should also cover the training necessary for NG to complete civil support missions. 
Another option is that if DoD acknowledges the homeland security mission with 
concurrent civil support tasking and assignments to NG, then this will help resolve the 
issue.  This education will apply to both federal and state missions.   
C. CONCLUSION  
The research questions identified two of the main causes of the gap in education: 
the reluctance of DoD to acknowledge the civil support mission and the inability to use 
federal funds to train the NG in civil support missions.  Recommendations point to the 
change in education for the NG if it is to be ready to respond to disasters.  If neither the 
DoD nor the NGB educates the NG leadership, then the status quo will not change.  The 
NG will continue to experience problems in responding to disasters, as is succinctly 
stated in the following assessment:   
Without a workforce that has the skills and experiences to operate across 
all the dimensions of homeland security-prevention, protection, 
preparedness, response, and recovery-the nation will not be able to protect 
itself against future catastrophes or manage them when they do happen. 
(Wormuth and Witkowsky, 2008, p. viii) 
In the end, protection of the nation and its civilians is the primary goal of a 
government and it’s military.  In order to accomplish this goal, the government must set 
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the conditions that allow the military to function effectively.  Because the military, and 
specifically the NG, has evolved to be a first responder to natural and manmade disasters 
to give civil support, the NG must be provided the necessary education and funding in 
order to facilitate its abilities when called up for support of civilians in disaster response.   
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APPENDIX I. SHORT COURSES OUTLINE, STATE RESPONSE 
HOMELAND SECURITY AND CIVIL SUPPORT  
1. Introduction,  
 a.  Instructors  
 b.  Topics  
 c.  Importance  
 
2. Lines of authority  
 a.  Constitution  
  i. President authorities  
  ii. Congress authorities (Controls, disasters are local)  
  iii. Militia  
 b. National Security Strategy (NSS)  
  i. Prevention, first priority  
  ii. National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) 
  iii. Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 
  iv. Executive Orders (EO) 
 c. National Military Strategy  
 d. Unified Command Plan (JP 3-26, A-6) 
  i. Combat Commanders, NORTHCOM  
 e. National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS)  
  i. Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD)  
  ii. National Planning Scenarios (NPS) 
  iii. Target Capabilities List (TCL) 
  iv. Universal Target List (UTL) 
 f. National Response Framework  
  i. FEMA  
  ii. ESF  
  iii. Special capabilities (CST, CERFP, Aviation) 
 g. National Incident Management System  
 h. Civil-Military Relationship (Theory) 
 88
 i. Critical analysis, creativity? 
 
3. Terms and definitions used in this arena  
 a.  Homeland Defense  
 b.  Homeland Security  
 c.  Civil Support  
 d.  DSCA  
 
4. National Guard Duty Status, Duties, Authorities, Controls  
 a.  Title 10  
 b.  Title 32  
 c.  State Active Duty  
 d.  Joint Forces Headquarters Mission Statement, (meaning and implications) 
 
5. Civil Support (Fed Terms) explanation  
 a. Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) include Consequence 
management, DODD 3025.15 
 b.  Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA/DSCA) DODD3025.1 
 c.  Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA)  
 d.  Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACD) DODD 3025.12 
 
6. Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) DODD 3025.15 
 
7. Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA/DSCA) DODD3025.1 Process, first 
military used at state level.   
 a.  Support, not take control, legal government in charge, supplement  
 b.  Levels of responsibilities  
 c.  Procedures  
 d.  Rules  
 e.  State process  
  i. Governor, Military Dept, NEMA, Disaster Declaration (Legal authority, 
Funding)  
  ii. EMAC  
  iii. State EOC  
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  iv. Military JOC  
  v. Gap fillers 
  vi. Roles and capabilities of each NG service, missions, culture 
  vii. Military preparation to support, family, preparedness  
  viii. JRSOI 
  ix. LNO 
  x. Response time, immediate response 
 f. Other State Roles 
 g. Federal Process  
  i. Stafford Act  
  ii. Economy Act 
  iii. Disaster Declaration (Legal authority, Funding)  
  iv. FEMA / DHS organization 
  v. Disaster Field Office,  
   Principal Federal Officer (PFO)  
   Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) 
   State Coordinating Officer (SCO) 
   Joint Field Office (JFO) 
  vi. Other Federal Roles 
  vii. Deploy Federal Troops, President, Sec Def Approval, JDOMS  
   Defense Coordination Officer (DCO)  
   Defense Coordination Element (DCE) 
   JTF  
 h. Immediate Response  
 i. Exercises 
 j. Interagency coordination 
 
8. Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA)  
 Counter Drug  
 
9. Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACD) DODD 3025.12 
 Reaction Force  
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APPENDIX II. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL NATIONAL 
GUARD CERTIFICATE PROGRAM COURSES  
The Foundations of Homeland Defense and Security.  This course was designed 
to provide the “knowledge required of the homeland security professional” (Supinski, 
Syllabus -NS 3181, 2007, p. 1) in the areas homeland security and homeland defense.  
The course had four subject areas:  The terrorist, policies and procedures, key players 
from federal to local levels, and lastly, legal issues involved, including the NG.  The five 
major learning objectives for this course were: 1. To understand the terrorists and why 
they hate the United States; 2. To learn and apply the federal policies and procedures; 3. 
To increase awareness of organizations involved, from federal to local levels, their roles, 
and how they relate to others in this process (how the states call out the NG); 4. To 
interpret and analyze problems and issues in this area; and 5. To build the students’ 
understanding of each subject area (Supinski, Syllabus -NS 3181, 2007, p. 1).  
Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Homeland Defense and Security; Collaboration 
to Integrate.  This course was designed to analyze the different agencies’ roles, 
responsibilities, policies, and missions, as well as their interaction with other agencies 
tasked with homeland security and homeland defense. The course had four subject matter 
areas: civil-military relations; interagency operations; intelligence fusion; and local, state, 
and national exercises. The seven major learning objectives for this course were:  1. To 
expose students to civilian agencies’ roles and responsibilities in homeland security; 2. 
To review the civil-military relations and legal issues; 3. To understand the NG role at the 
state level in civil-military affairs; 4. To understand the National Incident Management 
(NIMS) and intelligence community (IC); 5. To understand how the NG commands 
function in this arena; 6. To explore how the state and national levels share and fuse 
intelligence; and 7. To review exercises from local to national levels (Supinski, Syllabus -
NS 4882, 2007, p. 1).  
Strategic Planning and Organizational Imperatives in Homeland Defense and 
Security.  This course was designed to provide an overview of “comprehensive planning 
and organization to integrate and mobilize all levels of government and private sector 
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response” (Supinski, Syllabus NS 4756, 2007, p. 1). The course had three areas:  joint 
planning, critical infrastructure protection, and border operations.  Five major learning 
objectives for this course were: 1. To understand the National Response Plan/Framework; 
2. To review and assess the state and local planning; 3. To review national preparedness 
and capabilities; 4. To determine critical infrastructure/key resources and apply risk 
assessment; and 5. To review border issues, policies and process (Supinski, Syllabus NS 
4756, 2007, p. 1).   
Special Topics in Homeland Defense and Security.  This course was designed to 
provide an understanding of National Response Plan (NRP); National Incident 
Management System (NIMS); the process for local, state, and federal involvement; and 
the application of the process to NG involvement. The course has three areas: NPR and 
NIMS application; local, state, and federal interoperability; and special topics.  The three 
major learning objectives for these courses were: 1. To review applications of NRP and 
NIMS in the area of homeland security; 2. To review current topics in homeland security 
and homeland defense; and 3. To apply lessons learned by the NG through a concept-of-
operations exercise (Supinski, Syllabus NS 4920, 2007, p. 1).   
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